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I. INTRODUCTION

Are we better off shielding ourselves from epistemological doubt? If
so, should courts and legislatures construe religious free exercise rights
so as to enable religious adherents to preserve their salutary
dogmatism?1 A burgeoning literature on the nexus between religious
doubt and happiness suggests that religious certainty conduces to
psychological well-being.2 This literature has arisen from a larger effort
to comprehend the relationship between religion and happiness more

Eric Apar earned a Juris Doctor from the Georgetown University Law Center in May
2014.
1
See infra Part VII (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence).
2
See infra Part III.B (discussing the relationship between religious certainty and
happiness).
*
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generally—an effort that has yielded a welter of divergent themes and
findings.3
The objective of this analysis is two-fold: first, to distill these
disparate threads into coherent, meaningful insights; and second, to
gesture toward the implications of these insights for free exercise rights.
To begin, this Article sketches the psychology of religion and
epistemology generally before moving to an examination of the
psychological and sociological literature on the religion-happiness nexus
in particular.
With few dissenting voices, this literature offers
compelling evidence that religion promotes various measures of mental
well-being.4
I will then proceed to the crux of this analysis. The empirical
literature reveals that the religion-happiness connection may owe not to
religion itself, but rather to the salutary influence of epistemological
certainty.5 This finding clashes with the distaste for dogmatic certainty
that prevails among the learned classes, and with the concomitant
embrace of creeds that tolerate or even encourage doubt and selfscrutiny.6 It should bring disquiet to those who exalt the elastic religion
of the mainstream and condemn the unyielding faith of the true believer.
Finally, this Article questions whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence imperils epistemological certainty and the
psychological benefits that accompany it.7
The political, legal, and social implications of the religion-happiness
connection are far-reaching. From the living room to the courts, from
classrooms and houses of worship to legislatures and government
See infra Part III (explaining the nexus between religion and psychological well-being).
See infra Part III (examining the positive relationship between religion and well-being).
5
See infra Part III.B (discussing the role of certainty in the connection between wellbeing and religion).
6
See BRYAN WILSON, RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 174 (1982) (“Today,
religious perceptions share an uneasy and shrinking frontier with rational precepts”);
Philip Schwadel, The Effects of Education on Americans’ Religious Practices, Beliefs, and
Affiliations, 53 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 161, 164 (2011) (examining the capacity of higher
education to undermine religious certainty). One scholar states:
The emphasis on alternative viewpoints in higher education works
against the exclusivist assumption that one theistic system is superior
to other theistic systems. The belief that one religion is exclusively true
is contrary to the recognition of disparate perspectives and the
diversity of social networks associated with higher levels of education.
Put another way, highly educated Americans with diverse social
networks are relatively unlikely to emphasize that their friends’ and
associates’ beliefs are patently false.
Id.
7
See infra Part VII (discussing the potential impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence on epistemological certainty).
3
4

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/11

Apar: The Perils of Doubt: Happiness, Epistemological Certainty, and F

2014]

The Perils of Doubt

157

agencies, we find ourselves compelled either to respect or to breach the
walls that individuals, families, and communities build around their
faiths. Whether dissonance and doubt manage to penetrate these
defenses is a matter not only for parents and teachers, but for courts and
legislatures as well. As I will attempt to show, how carefully we guard
epistemological certainty—or, alternatively, how enthusiastically we
embrace cognitive dissonance as a vessel for truth seeking and personal
growth—may substantially influence the happiness of those whose
certainty is at stake.
The purpose of this analysis is not to challenge the wisdom of our
educational system’s commitment to critical reflection or the Supreme
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence. Doubt has many virtues and
certainty many perils.
Epistemological flexibility encourages
interpersonal understanding and amity.8 It exposes one to humanity’s
rich and variegated character, and it can be vital to personal growth.9
This Article is not advocating that we persist in error to preserve
epistemological order. It is merely urging that we consider the costs of
psychic dissonance, and that we not allow our zeal for spiritual
introspection to obscure the toll that religious doubt can exact.
II. KEEPING ORDER AND ALLAYING FEAR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
To place the literature on religion and happiness in its proper
context, we first must understand the psychology of religion and belief
more generally. The dominant currents in the literature on the
psychology of belief share a common theme: human beings try mightily
to avoid psychic discord and to construct coherent, orderly systems for
interpreting phenomena.10 Doubt and confusion invade these systems
like pathogens, creating dislocation and instability.11 Put simply,
humans seek to keep their epistemological houses in order.
Epistemological certainty is a natural—indeed, even an evolutionarily
advantageous—condition, a North Star in tempestuous waters.
Yet our universities and graduate schools boast of their capacity to
remove students from their comfort zones, to foster critical reflection on
even the most cherished orthodoxies.12 As this Article addresses below,
See infra Part V (discussing the relationship between faith and doubt).
See infra Part V (examining the benefits of doubt to personal growth).
10
See infra Part II (analyzing theories regarding the relationship between religion and
mental well-being).
11
See infra Part III (discussing the negative impact of doubt on well-being).
12
Rebecca Alpert, Force Students to Challenge Their Beliefs, TEMPLE NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://temple-news.com/opinion/op-ed-force-students-challenge-beliefs/, archived at
http://perma.cc/5L7A-Q5G6; see Charlene P.E. Burns, Cognitive Dissonance Theory and the
8
9
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the Supreme Court’s move away from vigorous enforcement of the Free
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution has weakened a potent weapon
against epistemological doubt—the constitutional right of religious
individuals and communities to act consistently with their convictions
and to insulate themselves from sources of dissonance, even in the face
of an otherwise binding legal obligation.13
A. Attachment, ETAS, and HADD Theories
Attachment theory and Evolutionary Threat Assessment Systems
theory (“ETAS”) proceed from the same basic insight—that human
beings are fundamentally insecure creatures that think and behave so as
to minimize their vulnerability to the vagaries of the external world.14
According to attachment theory, belief in a deity emerges from the same
impulse that induces a child to latch onto its mother.15 Just as a child
seeks the stability of a parent-caretaker, an anchor in an unstable world,
so too does the religious devotee seek refuge in the bond she develops
with a deity.16 A complex neurological machinery underpins the
formation of this bond.17 A strong attachment to God, the theory holds,
conduces to psychological welfare; a weak connection leaves one
exposed to psychological pathology, anxiety, and feelings of insecurity.18
Induced-Compliance Paradigm: Concerns for Teaching Religious Studies, 9 TEACHING THEOLOGY
& RELIGION 3, 5 (2006) (“[T]he liberal arts educational process itself trades on the power of
cognitive dissonance to enhance learning . . . ”).
13
See infra Part VII (discussing the potential impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence on epistemological certainty).
14
See Kevin J. Flannelly & Kathleen Galek, Religion, Evolution, and Mental Health:
Attachment Theory and ETAS Theory, 49 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 337, 342 (2010) (stating that
“the application of Attachment Theory to religion follows logically from the notion that
religion provides security in a world of uncertainty” (citation omitted)).
15
See Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Philip R. Shaver, An Attachment-Theoretical Approach to
Romantic Love and Religious Belief, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 266, 267 (1992)
(“Much like an infant’s primary caregiver, God may serve as a secure base and as a haven
of safety and comfort for believers”).
16
See Christopher G. Ellison, Religious Involvement and Subjective Well-Being, 32 J. HEALTH
& SOC. BEHAV. 80, 81 (1991) [hereinafter Ellison, Religious Involvement] (“[D]ivine interaction
may enhance perceived well-being by deepening the sense of orderliness and predictability
of events and by investing problematic situations with new religious meanings.”).
17
See Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 337–38 (“Evolutionary Threat Assessment
Systems Theory (ETAS Theory), proposes that religious and other kinds of beliefs directly
affect psychiatric symptomology via specific neural networks in the brain.” (citation
omitted)).
18
See Rodney Stark & Jared Maier, Faith and Happiness, 50 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 120, 123
(2008) (“People who feel extremely close to God are nearly twice as likely to be very happy
as are those who do not feel near to God.”); Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 342
(finding that “having a secure attachment with God appears to be associated with
psychological well-being”). “[I]ndividuals who had a secure attachment to God were more
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Where attachment theorists postulate a human impulse to forge
bonds with God, ETAS theorists maintain that religious convictions arise
from a basic human drive, hard-wired into our neurochemistry, to
neutralize external threats.19 Here, the evolutionary advantage derives
not from a strong attachment to a divine being, but from religion’s
capacity to defuse threats to human welfare.20 The distinction here is
subtle, for both theories rest on a fundamental desire for stability amid
chaos. But where attachment theory does not speak to the substance of
the divine anchor that religion provides, ETAS theorists argue that
religion’s evolutionary advantage requires that the adherent hold a
sanguine conception of God.21 Under ETAS theory, a vindictive God,
however stable, does nothing to counterbalance the threats to human
well-being that lurk in the external environment—to the contrary, it
compounds them.22 A loving God offers not only stability, as under
attachment theory, but safety as well.23 Buoyed by the belief that a
satisfied with life and less lonely than individuals who had an insecure attachment to
God. . . . [S]ecure attachment [is] related to lower anxiety, and . . . insecure attachment
to . . . higher anxiety and negative affect.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Christopher G.
Ellison et al., Religious Resources, Spiritual Struggles, and Mental Health in a Nationwide Sample
of PCUSA Clergy, 59 PASTORAL PSYCHOL. 287, 289–90 (2010) [hereinafter Ellison, Religious
Resources] (“Struggles in one’s relationship with the divine are associated with a range of
mental health outcomes, such as elevated rates of anxiety . . . depression and suicidality.”
(citations omitted)).
19
See Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 345 (“[C]ertain beliefs about God and life-afterdeath reduce ETAS assessments about the dangerousness of the world and . . . this directly
reduces psychiatric symptoms.”).
20
See David H. Rosmarin, Kenneth I. Pargament & Annette Mahoney, The Role of
Religiousness in Anxiety, Depression, and Happiness in a Jewish Community Sample: A
Preliminary Investigation, 12 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & CULTURE 97, 108 (2009) (“[T]rust
and mistrust in God were significant predictors of anxiety, depression, and happiness.
Trust in God . . . may engender positive cognitions about the future, leading to decreases in
hopelessness and depression and increases in happiness.”).
21
See id. at 100 (considering the ways in which trust in God reduces anxiety). Some
scholars maintain that:
[T]rust in God may reduce negative appraisals of perceived danger.
After all, if one believes that God knows everything, has the power to
take care of any situation, and is merciful, generous, and righteous,
there would seem to be less to be afraid of. Furthermore, while
intolerance to uncontrollability and unpredictability has been posited
to play a central role in human anxiety, the importance of these
cognitive factors may be undermined by the belief that God is merciful
and generous . . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
22
See Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 345 (“[P]leasant beliefs about life-after-death
were all associated with lower levels of psychiatric symptoms, while unpleasant afterlife
beliefs were associated with higher levels of symptoms among normal adults.”).
23
See id. at 344–45 (describing the relationship between religious security and
psychiatric disorders).
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beneficent overseer superintends their surroundings, human beings can
venture into a hazardous world in relative peace.24
According to the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (“HADD”)
hypothesis, belief in God derives from our innate desire to ascribe
phenomena to an intelligent agent whose actions are comprehensible.25
The human psyche rebels against arbitrariness and instability.26 Its
natural condition is to discern a knowing actor responsible for the
stewardship of an orderly universe.27 Together, these theories testify to a
common principle: man is essentially a scared and fragile creature,
grasping for order in a tumultuous world. Religion—at least when it
confers on its practitioners a feeling of comfort and safety—helps allay
this condition.28 It is both natural and evolutionarily advantageous.29 It
empowers man to function in a dangerous world and to cope with the
vicissitudes and uncertainties of existence.30 But it serves this function
only insofar as it offers a genuine refuge from those vicissitudes. If
religion is yet another uncertainty in a precarious world, man remains
rudderless.31
24
See id. at 342–45 (finding that a secure attachment engenders feelings of safety in
threatening circumstances).
25
See Joshua C. Thurow, Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to be Irrational? The
Epistemic Consequences of the Cognitive Science of Religion, 74 INT. J. PHILOS. & RELIGION 77,
80–81 (2013) (“Humans possess . . . a hypersensitive agency detection device—HADD. In
virtue of HADD, people seem to have a strong bias to interpret ambiguous evidence as
caused by . . . an agent.” (citations omitted)).
26
See id. at 81 (discussing the tendency to seek explanations for events and suggesting
“that god concepts are minimally counterintuitive”).
27
See JUSTIN L. BARRETT, WHY WOULD ANYONE BELIEVE IN GOD? 31 (2004) (maintaining
that belief in God is a natural phenomenon arising from cognitive tools possessed by every
human being).
28
See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 82 (“There is mounting evidence
that persons who enjoy a greater sense of coherence and order in their lives also have better
physical and psychological health than others. [R]esearchers frequently have suggested
that strong religious beliefs and experiences may deepen this sense of meaning and
comprehensibility.” (citations omitted)).
29
Ed Diener et al., The Religion Paradox: If Religion Makes People Happy, Why Are So Many
Dropping Out?, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1278, 1279 (2011) (“[E]volutionary
analysts [argue that] religion is nearly universal because it serves adaptive purposes. The
supporters of religion argue that by fostering morality, social cohesion, and group survival,
religion may aid coping.”).
30
See Jan Eichhorn, Happiness for Believers? Contextualizing the Effects of Religiosity on LifeSatisfaction, 28 EUR. SOC. REV. 583, 584–85 (2012) (analyzing the influence of religiosity on
life satisfaction in different countries).
31
See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Religious Doubts and Sleep Quality: Findings from a
Nationwide Study of Presbyterians, 53 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 119, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Ellison
et al., Religious Doubt] (“[B]ecause religious faith provides a sense of meaning and
purpose . . . unresolved religious doubts may signal an existential crisis. Individuals
dealing with this uncertainty . . . may feel restless and worried, and may find it more
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B. Terror Management Theory
Under terror management theory, systems of meaning and belief
develop in response to humans’ innate terror of death and from the
transience of human life.32 Coherent systems of meaning and belief offer
stability and permanence in the face of human mortality.33 Religion
serves three purposes here. First, religion responds directly to our dread
of death by doing away with mortality altogether.34 Belief in an afterlife
allays our fear of death by converting the specter of expiration into a
mere transitional moment—though, as with ETAS theory, the benefit
here depends on the belief that one is transitioning to a happier place, a
wrinkle to which this Article will return later.35 Second, religion imbues
its adherents with purpose and direction—it militates against the
depressing conclusion that life is not only tragically fleeting, but

difficult to deal with the demands of daily life and personal problems.”). “The negative
thoughts and ruminations over this form of spiritual strain . . . may give rise to feelings of
psychological distress . . . [and] may in turn trigger the release of stress hormones [] that
promote mental and physiological arousal.” Id. (citations omitted).
32
See R. David Hayward & Marta Elliott, Fitting in with the Flock: Social Attractiveness as a
Mechanism for Well-Being in Religious Groups, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 592, 593 (2009)
(examining the importance of specific aspects of religious beliefs). These scholars explain:
There is theoretical support from the Terror Management perspective
that rather than the specific contents of religious beliefs, it is the
capacity for religious faith to provide a sense of existential certainty
that is most important in promoting well-being. While this aspect of
religion has been directly measured less frequently than others, it has
some empirical support.
Id. (citations omitted).
33
See Gareth J. Morris & Tina McAdie, Are Personality, Well-Being and Death Anxiety
Related to Religious Affiliation?, 12 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & CULTURE 115, 116 (2009)
(“[S]tudies have found strong religious conviction to be associated with lower death
anxiety.” (citations omitted)).
34
See Samuel R. Weber et al., Psychological Distress Among Religious Nonbelievers: A
Systematic Review, 51 J. REL. HEALTH 72, 80 (2012) (“In a Swedish study, atheists and
agnostics scored higher on the Death Depression Scale . . . than did believers, indicating
greater death anxiety in the non-believing groups.”).
35
Id.; see also Morris & McAdie, supra note 33, at 119 (discussing Greenberg’s Terror
Management Theory). Greenberg found as follows:
Terror Management Theory as Christians scored lower for death
anxiety than the non-religious participants. However, as Muslims
scored significantly higher than the non-religious, this refutes TMT. It
appears as though for Muslims, belief in the afterlife does not serve to
reduce anxiety about death. It can be understood through the
individual responses of the Christians in the questionnaire how TMT
functions. Themes of heaven and eternal life are prevalent, whereas
for Muslims the afterlife may be something to fear . . .
Id.
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meaningless as well.36 Third, religion breeds attachment to values and
principles that transcend the ephemeral material world.37 The stability
and permanence of these values counterbalance the essential instability
and impermanence of human existence. While flesh and blood may
perish, our ideals persist. Belief helps us fashion an enduring legacy in
the face of our mortality.38
These last two functions are not exclusive to religion. Strong
conviction, whether religious or secular, can confer meaning, purpose,
and a feeling of permanence. Our terror of death motivates us to repel
See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute to Individual Life
Satisfaction?, 68 SOC. FORCES 100, 102 (1989) [hereinafter Ellison et al., Does Religious
Commitment Contribute] (“After holding constant the influence of background
variables . . . only religious salience was a useful predictor of a sense of the ‘meaning’ and
‘purpose’ of life.”).
37
Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of
Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681, 681 (1989). See Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror
Management Theory II: The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or
Bolster the Cultural Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 308, 308 (1990)
[hereinafter Theory II] (“Although there is great variability in the contents of the
worldviews associated with any given culture, all such conceptions provide the universe
with order, meaning, value, and the possibility of either literal or symbolic immortality.”).
38
See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 689 (demonstrating the important role morals
play in shaping cultural standards). Rosenblatt explains:
[M]oral principles are part of the more general set of cultural standards
against which people compare themselves to assess their value. Thus,
moral principles facilitate the individual’s efforts to conceive of him- or
herself as a valued contributor to something meaningful and
permanent (the culture). . . . [T]he cultural anxiety-buffer allows
continual repression of our existential terror. . . . Although the terror
may on occasion rise to consciousness in muted form, most of the
anxiety people experience results from threats to either the worldview
or self-esteem components of the cultural anxiety-buffer that protects
them from underlying existential terror.
Id. (citation omitted). Theory II states:
[F]rom a terror management perspective, one very important function
of culture . . . is to provide a means of conceptualizing reality that
allows for the possibility of equanimity in the face of human
vulnerability and mortality. Put simply, people’s beliefs about reality
provide a buffer against the anxiety that results from living in a largely
uncontrollable, perilous universe, where the only certainty is death.
Theory II, supra note 37, at 308. “Christians with a strong religious conviction scored lower
for death anxiety than non-religious participants. . . . [B]elief in the afterlife is associated
with lower death anxiety.” Morris & McAdie, supra note 33, at 118. “Witter and associates
suggest that religiosity may facilitate . . . ‘achieving enduring significance beyond one’s
physical self and life.’” Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at
103 (citations omitted); see also Robert A. Witter et al., Religion and Subjective Well-Being in
Adulthood: A Quantitative Synthesis, 26 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 332, 332 (1985) (noting the link
between “achieving enduring significance beyond one’s physical self and life” and “inner
contentment.”).
36
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threats not only to our religious conceptions, but also to our cultural and
political values.39 Researchers have found that heightened mortality
awareness diminishes tolerance of heterodoxy and magnifies the desire
to reinforce norms.40 After responding to a questionnaire designed to
raise mortality awareness, judges doled out harsher penalties for
hypothetical defendants whose behavior challenged social norms.41
Moreover, study participants reported stronger animus toward members
of other religious denominations after experimenters made mortality
salient.42 They also recorded amplified hostility toward those who
questioned—and a greater affinity for those who praised—their cultural
worldviews.43
Our terror of death and our beliefs, religious or otherwise, appear to
be interwoven. To the extent that religion kindles an unusually powerful
sense of meaning and permanence—and inasmuch as it simply
eliminates mortality entirely—it is uniquely adroit at managing our fear
of death.44 But the purpose of this discussion is not to distinguish
39
See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 688 (examining reactions to deviations from an
individual’s cultural worldview). Terror management theory is described as follows:
According to terror management theory, the beliefs and values that
make up an individual’s cultural worldview serve the vital function of
buffering the anxiety that results from awareness of human
vulnerability and mortality. The theory posits that the cultural
worldview espoused by any given individual is a fragile construction
that needs persistent social validation . . . Those who deviate from
cultural standards are responded to with disdain because such
behavior threatens the values that underlie the individual’s source of
security. Similarly, those who uphold cultural values are admired
because such behavior validates the individual’s values.
Id.; see also Theory II, supra note 37, at 309 (“Cultural worldviews are structured so that
protection from negative outcomes and a sense of immortality depend on fulfilling the
cultural requirements for being valued.”).
40
See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 688 (“[T]he six studies reported in this article
provide consistent support for terror management theory . . . . The present finding that
reminding subjects of their mortality intensifies such reactions supports the proposition
that the cultural worldview serves to protect individuals from anxiety concerning death.”);
see also Theory II, supra note 37, at 309 (“[P]ositive reactions to similar others and negative
reactions to dissimilar others occur partly because of the impact such individuals have on
faith in one’s worldview.”).
41
See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 688 (“[S]ubjects who were reminded of their
mortality consistently recommended harsher treatment of a moral transgressor.”).
42
See Theory II, supra note 37, at 318 (“Mortality salience appears to increase in-group
favoritism, rejection of those who are different, and authoritarian tendencies.”).
43
See id. (“This suggests that whenever events heighten mortality salience (e.g.,
newspaper accounts of catastrophes or violence in intergroup and interindividual
conflicts), in-group solidarity, out-group derogation, nationalism, religious extremism,
prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance of deviance are likely to escalate.”).
44
See Neal Krause & Keith M. Wulff, Religious Doubt and Health: Exploring the Potential
Dark Side of Religion, 65 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 35, 39-40 (2004) (“[A] number of
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religious from secular conviction. Rather, it is to illustrate the stakes
involved in matters of belief, religion, or otherwise. Terror management
theory suggests that when the ideologue lashes out at her detractors,
there is more than simple divergence of opinion at work. Indeed, such
outrage emerges as well from an effort to allay death anxiety.
C. Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance theorists posit that the human mind seeks
psychic harmony. Human beings, the theory holds, will go to great
lengths to convince themselves that their epistemologies are true,
consistent, and consonant with their behavior.45 Perceived incongruence
among beliefs or between beliefs and behavior engenders painful
discomfort that the mind seeks to quell.46 One might attempt to reason
one’s way out of the tension, manipulating logic to bring discordant
beliefs or behaviors into concordance.47 One might claim a lack of
volition. Indeed, evidence suggests that we feel more comfortable
embracing dissonance-inducing behaviors or beliefs when doing so is
necessary to receive a particularly enticing reward or to avoid an

investigators maintain that one of the primary functions of religion is to provide a sense of
meaning in life.” (citation omitted)). “[I]dentity theory suggests that religious doubt may
be pernicious primarily because it deprives a person of one of the most fundamental
benefits of religion—a sense of meaning in life.” Id. “[P]roblems associated with roles that
are valued highly have a more noxious effect on health and well-being than difficulties that
arise in roles that are not as important.” Id. at 40 (citation omitted). “[I]t follows that if
religion is valued highly, and doubts about religion arise, then subsequent feelings of
cognitive dissonance should be especially troublesome.” Id.
45
See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3–4, 10–11 (1957)
(discussing the theory of cognitive dissonance and its effects on human psychology).
46
See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (explaining situations that lead to the “Hypocrisy
Effect”). Burns elaborates:
When situations reveal an inconsistency between ideas to which one
has personal commitment and [one’s] actual behavior, dissonance
tends to be very high and the need to reduce it is strong. When the
beliefs are personally important, being placed in a position that makes
it clear that one is not practicing what she preaches can be perceived as a
threat to one’s self-image.
Id. “Cognitive dissonance indeed appears to cause an arousing and negative affective
state. . . . Moreover, the negative affect evoked by dissonance motivates dissonance
reduction . . . ” Christopher T. Burris, Eddie Harmon-Jones & W. Ryan Tarpley, “By Faith
Alone”: Religious Agitation and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 17,
18 (1997) (citations omitted).
47
See generally FESTINGER, supra note 45, at 31 (explaining how people rationalize
behavior discordant with their beliefs); Burns, supra note 12, at 3-4 (elaborating on the
discounting of dissonant ideas and the emphasizing of consonant ideas).
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especially undesirable outcome.48 One might attack the credibility or
motives of the source rather than engage the conflict substantively.49
One might cling even more tightly to the challenged conviction,
drowning out the tension.50 Finally, one might alter one’s behavior or
beliefs in an effort to erase the contradiction and restore psychic
harmony.51 However one escapes the discomfort, the implication is
clear—our minds seek peace and eschew angst.
Epistemological doubt is a species of cognitive dissonance.52
Religious doubt in particular can be a singularly discombobulating
experience, for religion often undergirds its adherents’ entire
epistemology—remove the foundation, and the whole edifice collapses.53

48
See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (“[W]hen a learner believes there is no choice, dissonance
is nominal because the lack of choice is itself sufficient justification for compliance.”
(citation omitted)). “Despite their inability to practice plural marriage, [Mormons] could
point to external coercion as justification for their behavior and thus minimize any
dissonance they felt. However, . . . [b]ecause the final push to conform came from within
the Mormon community rather than from without, Mormons could no longer point to
outside forces for this change in belief.” Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People:
Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the
Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1318 (1997–98) (footnote omitted).
49
See Burns, supra note 12, at 4, 6 (discussing the “Hypocrisy Effect”).
50
See id. at 4 (“In some instances, then, cognitive dissonance can actually intensify
original attitudes.” (citation omitted)); see also Burris et al., supra note 46, at 24 (“More
extreme profession of transcendent beliefs (God’s working as mysterious but benevolent,
etc.) following exposure to a belief-threatening article was associated with reduced
dissonance-related affect (both agitation and discomfort).”); Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48,
at 1309 (“Contrary to ordinary expectations, external challenge and resistance may actually
strengthen an adherent’s commitment to a particular religious creed.”).
51
See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (“Any dissonance that does arise can be reduced or
eliminated by changing ones beliefs to make them more consonant with the induced
behavior.”) (citation omitted).
52
See Neal Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being: A Longitudinal
Investigation, 50 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH, 94, 95–96 (2006) [hereinafter Krause, Religious
Doubt and Psychological Well-Being] (“[R]eligious doubt may be viewed as an unsettling state
of indecision that arises from seeing the validity of two seemingly inconsistent points of
view. . . . Viewed in this way, doubt may be seen as a specific instance of the more general
problem of cognitive dissonance.” (citation omitted)); see also Krause & Wulff, supra note
44, at 36 (“Religious doubt is defined as, ‘ . . . a feeling of uncertainty toward, and a
questioning of, religious teachings and beliefs.’” (citation omitted)).
53
See Theta Gribbins & Brian Vandenberg, Religious Fundamentalism, the Need for
Cognitive Closure, and Helping, 21 INT’L J. FOR THE PSYCHOL. OF RELIGION 106, 106–07 (2011)
(analyzing religion’s role as a central system of beliefs). Gribbins and Vandenberg explain:
[Religious fundamentalism] differs from other fundamentalisms with
rigidly held ideologies, such as market fundamentalism for example,
in that it is an overarching belief system that regulates not only
religious thoughts but all conceptions; it is in essence a ‘meta-belief’ or
worldview. This worldview provides an absolute foundation for
determining what is and what should be, what is good and evil, and
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To grow up in the embrace of a loving, omnipotent God, only to discover
the ultimate rejoinder in the form of human suffering; to believe that one
possesses the one Truth only to find that it is merely one among many—
such realizations not only discomfort the believer, they undermine the
entire moral structure that derives from these convictions.54 The triggers
In a
of epistemological and religious doubt are ubiquitous.55
heterogeneous society, we constantly encounter reminders that our
convictions are not universal, that others hold divergent views with
equal ardor and confidence.56 When these societal cues alert us to the
what is known and unknowable, which are conferred by an
omniscient, omnipotent being.
Id. (citations omitted).
54
See id. (explaining the psychological effects or realization of such); see also Krause &
Wulff, supra note 44, at 38 ([I]t may be difficult for a person to believe in a loving and
protecting God, while at the same time recognizing there is a good deal of suffering, pain,
and injustice in the world. Cognitive dissonance is especially important . . . because, as
Festinger . . . argues, holding views that are incompatible can be a significant source of
psychological distress.” (citation omitted)). See generally Ellison et al., Religious Doubts,
supra note 31, at 122 (considering the sources and consequences of religious reservations).
These scholars believe that:
Doubts or other nagging reservations about matters of faith can
emerge from numerous sources, including the problem of evil, as
believers struggle to understand why bad things happen, particularly
to good people. Many persons also grapple with challenges posed by
scientific developments, as well as a host of other issues concerning
religious dogmas and institutional practices. . . . [A] growing body of
evidence links unresolved doubts with a range of negative mental and
physical health outcomes.
Id. (citations omitted).
55
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 97 (“Doubts
about religion are inevitable because the world is filled with seemingly contradictory
evidence and experiences . . . [s]o the real issue is not the elimination of doubt. Instead, it
involves how doubt is handled—how people respond to it.” (citation omitted)); see also
Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 50 (“[B]elief systems are maintained primarily through
commitment, and commitment is, in turn, dependent on validation. . . . It is simply not
possible to verify that God exists, and the character, purposes, and will of God cannot be
validated. When validation is not possible, doubts may arise.”); Greenberg et al., supra
note 37, at 309 (“Because the cultural anxiety-buffer is by its very nature a fragile social
construction . . . it requires continual bolstering.” (citations omitted)). “[P]eople are
constantly reminded of their vulnerability and mortality; one need only pick up a
newspaper or turn on a television news program to find examples of such reminders of the
fragile nature of human existence.” Id.
56
See Simon Dein, Religious Doubts: Implications for Psychopathology and Psychotherapy, 77
BULLETIN OF THE MENNINGER CLINIC 201, 204 (2013) (“[F]ar more than in the past, believers
must live their faith in a condition of doubt and uncertainty. Today, religious
faith . . . exists as but one possibility alongside a range of nonreligious worldviews.
Pluralistic worldviews intensify the experience of doubt.”). Theory II states:
[T]he diverse array of beliefs and values that are encountered provide
a reminder that one’s worldview may not be valid in any absolute
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possibility that our beliefs are misguided, we experience profound
disquiet—but the damage does not end there. Such cues also undermine
a primordial attachment to God (attachment theory), a threatneutralizing mechanism (ETAS theory), our desire to discern order in the
universe (HADD theory), and our capacity to allay our terror of death
(terror management theory).
Understanding these links between
religion and psychology is vital to situating the empirical literature on
religion and happiness in its proper context.
III. THE HAPPY FAITHFUL: THE RELIGION-HAPPINESS NEXUS
Recent decades have seen an explosion of research into the
connection between religion and happiness.57 Once an obscure niche, the
field has grown into a fruitful area of research at the forefront of
psychology, sociology, and medicine.58 While the results have not been
uniform, the weight of the evidence suggests that religiosity correlates
with various indices of mental and physical well-being.59

sense, highlighting the tenuous nature of the cultural anxiety-buffer
and contributing to the need for ongoing bolstering and protection
from threat. To the extent that people need to believe that one and
only one conception of reality is ultimately correct, the existence of
conceptions at variance with their own implies that someone must be
mistaken.
Theory II, supra note 37, at 309.
57
See generally HAROLD C. KOENIG ET AL., HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND HEALTH 101–17
(2001) (presenting data on numerous studies correlating religion with well-being).
58
See id. at 97–98, 116–17 (identifying a growth in research into the connection between
religion and happiness).
59
See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1278 (“In the National Opinion Research Center’s
General Social Surveys of Americans between 1972 and 2008, the percentage of people
reporting that they were ‘very happy’ ranged from 26% among those never attending
religious services to 48% among those attending services more than weekly.”). Ellison
suggests that:
[R]eligion may enhance various aspects of well-being in at least four
ways: 1) through social integration and support; 2) through the
establishment of personal relationships with a divine other; 3) through
the provision of systems of meaning and existential coherence; and 4)
through the promotion of more specific patterns of religious
organization and personal lifestyle.
Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 80. Another scholar believes that:
In large part, results from these studies have been consistent in
indicating a salutary relationship between religious involvement and
health status . . . Across this literature, the consistency of findings
despite the diversity of samples, designs, methodologies, religious
measures, health outcomes, and population characteristics actually
serves to strengthen the inference of a positive association between
religion and health.
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A preliminary note is in order. Happiness is a nebulous and
capacious concept, encompassing various facets of well-being from
short-term gratification to long-term fulfillment. However, because
religion appears to exert a salutary effect across these diverse measures
of personal welfare, this Article will steer clear of the definitional morass
and employ the catch-all term “happiness” to refer to generally pleasant
states of being, from the ephemeral to the more enduring.
It is worth observing that the social sciences—psychology in
particular—have not always held such a sunny conception of religion.60
Indeed, recent trends have marked a departure from the old Freudian
view of religion as neurosis and pathology.61 On this traditional account,
religion meant repression of primal impulses, guilt and shame at
violating rigid precepts, and dread of a fiery hereafter.62 This attitude
has by no means vanished. It survives most prominently in the polemics
of the “New Atheists,” who have tapped a fertile market for antireligious sentiment.63 It also finds some empirical support in a distinct
minority of studies that have found that religion correlates with death,
anxiety, guilt, and neuroticism.64

Loren Marks, Religion and Bio-Psycho-Social Health: A Review and Conceptual Model, 44 J. REL.
& HEALTH 173, 179 (2005) (quoting KOENIG ET AL.). “[D]ata from a national sample [show]
that those who are most involved with their religion are almost twice as likely to report
being ‘very happy’ than those with the least involvement . . . [R]eligious variables
accounted for 5–7% of variance in life satisfaction.” Daniel Mochon, Michael I. Norton &
Dan Ariely, Who Benefits from Religion?, 101 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 1, 2 (2011) (citations
omitted). “[R]eligious adults report greater feelings of social integration, a personal
relationship with a divine being, a good sense of cohesion in life, and a specified pattern of
organization in which to live one’s life. These outcomes are associated with greater levels
of personal well-being for adults.” Richard J. Petts & Chris Knoester, Parents’ Religious
Heterogamy and Children’s Well-Being, 46 J. SCI. STUD. OF RELIGION 373, 374 (2007).
60
See Marks, supra note 59, at 174 (“For the first three-quarters of the 20th century, the
prevalent view of religion’s relationship to health among both medical and social scientists
was apathetic at best, and actively hostile at worst.”).
61
See id. (“By the mid-1990s, the pendulum of religion-related medical and social science
publication seemed to have swung . . . to [] empirical work that frequently correlated
religious experience with a variety of beneficial health-related outcomes. . . . ”).
62
See id. (“This hostile camp is perhaps most conspicuously represented by Freud, who
maligned religion as mankind’s universal obsessional neurosis.” (citation omitted)).
63
See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1279 (“Although religion is a widespread social and
cultural phenomenon, its atheist critics claim that it is dysfunctional. It is ‘dangerous
nonsense’ that does ‘not make its adherents happy’ . . . This religion-breeds-misery meme
resonates with the surmise of Sigmund Freud, who famously viewed religion as ‘a
universal obsessional neurosis.’” (citations omitted)).
64
See generally John Maltby, Protecting the Sacred and Expressions of Rituality: Examining
the Relationship Between Extrinsic Dimensions of Religiosity and Unhealthy Guilt, 78 PSYCHOL.
AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES. & PRACTICE 77, 81 (2005) (explaining the connection
between religion and negative psychological states).
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Still, the thrust of the empirical literature is clear—religion appears
to exert a salutary effect on happiness.65 This relationship appears across
various dimensions of happiness—from transient well-being to abiding
satisfaction, from the absence of depression and psychological pathology
to affirmative contentment.66
On a deeper level, however, complexities intrude that prevent a
straightforward embrace of religion as a vehicle for happiness. Religion
is a complex and multifaceted construct, and researchers early
recognized that more sophisticated measures of religiosity than
“attendance at religious services” or “frequency of prayer” were
necessary to comprehend the nexus between religion and happiness.67
The most noted distinction that emerged was that between intrinsic and
extrinsic religiosity.68
A. The Intrinsic-Extrinsic Divide
Many have asserted that the religion-happiness nexus owes to the
social connections that religious involvement nurtures.69 Congregational
See generally KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, at 101 (describing the correlation between
religion and positive psychological states).
66
Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 114–16, 106
(defining life satisfaction as “essentially a cognitive assessment of progress toward desired
goals—an evaluation of the congruence between ideal and real life circumstances” and
noting its connection to religion). Marks expands on this notion as follows:
In addition to general ‘salutary religious effect,’ certain religious
practices have also been correlated with positive coping in connection
with both ‘acute’ and ‘day-to-day stresses’ of life in a wide variety of
contexts . . . Religiosity has also been correlated with a number of
specific positive mental health outcomes, including greater personal
happiness and/or self-esteem . . . and lower rates of depression.
Marks, supra note 59, at 180 (citations omitted). See generally KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57,
at 117 (summarizing the relationship between religion and happiness).
67
See David H. Rosmarin, Kenneth I. Pargament & Annette Mahoney, The Role of
Religiousness in Anxiety, Depression, and Happiness in a Jewish Community Sample: A
Preliminary Investigation, 12 MENTAL HEALTH, REL., & CULTURE 97, 99–100 (2009) (“[A]n
emerging trend in psychology of religion research has been to study aspects of
religiousness that are more proximally and functionally connected to psychological
variables alongside measures of global religiousness. Examples of proximal religiousness
include perceived closeness to God, religious coping, sanctification, and religious/spiritual
struggles.” (citations omitted)).
68
See Ahmed M. Abdel-Khalek, Happiness, Health, and Religiosity: Significant Relations, 9
MENTAL HEALTH, REL. & CULTURE 85, 87–88 (2006) (“There are several recent theoretical
and empirical studies emphasizing the different experiences and outcomes associated with
diverse types of religiosity. Foremost among them is the intrinsic versus extrinsic religious
orientation.”).
69
See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 584−85 (“Religiosity might provide a safety net
function, offering security and comfort particularly in difficult or uncertain life situations.
The engagement in communal activities and the provision of a network of acquaintances
65
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life can serve as a well-spring for personal relationships and a network of
support in times of distress.70 Indeed, empirical research has amply
demonstrated the connection between social ties and happiness.71 The
religion-happiness connection, many have argued, is chiefly an extension
of this well-corroborated insight.
That congregational life forges intimate social connections is indeed
an important part of the religion-happiness calculus. Congregants
derive pleasure, meaning, and comfort from the bonds that they develop
Is such the essence of faith?
Does
with their coreligionists.72
particularistic dogma belong on the periphery, with community and
brotherhood at the fore?
It is likely that this common explanation of the religion-happiness
nexus misconceives the function of social connections. How precisely it
misunderstands this function is a subject to which this Article will return
later.73 For now, it suffices to note that this explanation clashes with a
well-established divide in the empirical literature. Where intrinsic
religiosity—religion for its own sake, true belief—correlates positively
with happiness in its various manifestations, extrinsic religiosity—
religion for the purpose of achieving some ancillary objective, such as
cultivating social ties or attaining inner peace—appears not to correlate
positively, and in many instances appears to correlate negatively, with
happiness.74 It is what is in the adherent’s mind, rather than religion’s
and actual friends and supporters is a . . . community-inclusion focused, perspective
commonly invoked to explain the findings.” (citation omitted)); Stark & Maier, supra note
18, at 123, 125 (noting that “the effects of religion seem to be primarily ‘social’ rather than
doctrinal . . . A number of scholars have suggested that . . . the major effect of religion on
happiness is achieved by embedding people in supportive congregations where they enjoy
warm social relationships.”); Witter et al., supra note 38, at 336–37 (“[R]eligion affects
subjective well-being more strongly via the influence of social integration as compared to
ego transcendence. However, the interrelationships among social integration, religious
participation, and religiosity may be complex.”).
70
See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 584–85 (explaining the correlation between religious
communities and social support). See generally KOENIG ET AL., supra note 65 at 458–61
(identifying the positive effects of social support from religious organizations).
71
See, e.g., Luke William Galen & James D. Kloet, Mental Well-Being in the Religious and
Non-Religious: Evidence for a Curvilinear Relationship, 14 MENTAL HEALTH, REL. & CULTURE
673, 681 (2011) (“[M]embers of a cohesive group will display greater emotional stability to
the extent that they are actively involved in a supportive social milieu.”).
72
See Marks, supra note 59, at 176 (“[Religion] impacts psychological coping through
social, emotional, and moral support a faith community can provide, particularly in times
of stress, crisis, or bereavement.” (citation omitted)).
73
See infra Part IV.B (considering possibly that the religion-happiness connection owes
predominantly to the social connections that religious involvement facilitates).
74
Kristopher J. Gauthier et al., Religiosity, Religious Doubt, and the Need for Cognition:
Their Interactive Relationship with Life Satisfaction, 7 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 139, 140 (2006).
Gauthier et al. stated:
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practical value, that principally accounts for the religion-happiness
connection.75
To be sure, this does not definitively discredit the notion that
religion properly understood should be emancipated from particularistic
dogma. There is much to commend a conception of religion that seeks to
harness religion’s utility while shedding the zealotry and parochialism.
But such a conception does not pave the way to personal happiness—
societal amity and understanding, perhaps, but not individual
happiness.76
That it is authentic conviction, rather than religion’s ancillary social
or personal value, that undergirds the religion-happiness nexus tells us
little about what sort of belief we should prefer if we desire happiness.
Perhaps the elastic faith of the mainstream—the sort that tolerates and
even encourages doubt—conduces best to happiness. After all, such
faith is generally undemanding, forgiving of waywardness, and less

[E]xtrinsic religiosity (i.e., engaging in religion for external incentives
such as social contacts), was negatively correlated with several
indicators of mental well-being, including appropriate social behavior,
freedom from worry and guilt, personal competence and control, and
open-mindedness and flexibility. Conversely, intrinsic religiosity (i.e.,
engaging in religion to integrate it into one’s daily affairs) was
positively correlated with appropriate social behavior, freedom from
worry and guilt, a sense of personal competence and control, and
personality unification and organization.
Id.; Karen Hwang, Joseph H. Hammer & Ryan T. Cragun, Extending Religion-Health Research
to Secular Minorities: Issues and Concerns, 50 J. REL. & HEALTH 608, 609 (2011) (“People also
attend church services for a variety of reasons—e.g. for the social network or out of familial
obligation—not always having to do with actual worship.”). “10% of Americans who do
not believe in a god attend religious services weekly, not out of religious devotion, but
rather for pragmatic reasons, like preserving familial harmony or to maintain a circle of
friendships.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Maltby, supra note 64, at 78 (“Generally,
research suggests that an intrinsic orientation towards religion is associated with better
mental health, while an extrinsic orientation toward religion is associated with poorer
mental health.”).
75
See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 583 (“[I]ntrinsic and extrinsic forms of religiosity
differently affect the level of life-satisfaction. Attitudinal evaluations of personal levels of
religiosity tend to be positively associated with measures of subjective well-being.
However, the same is not true for practiced aspects of religiosity, pointing to the relevance
of distinguishing different mechanisms.” (citations omitted)); Ellison et al., Does Religious
Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 105 (“Hadaway and Roof concluded: ‘ . . . [I]t
would appear that meaning is the more distinctively religious resource. Not that religious
belonging is unimportant, but the social integration it provides also can be provided by
other voluntary organizations.’”); see also Marks, supra note 59, at 179 (“[T]he importance of
one’s faith had the strongest association with positive mental health, even after controlling
for the effect of other significant variables, age and education . . . highlighting attitudes
rather than practices, as the stronger spiritual variables related to mental health . . . .”).
76
See infra Part V (discussing the “growth-doubt” nexus).
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prone to saddling its adherents with overpowering guilt.77 Who indeed
should wish upon herself the rigors and anxieties of rigid fealty to
religious doctrine? She who seeks happiness should.78
B. The Perils of Doubt, the Virtues of Certainty
Having established that it is genuine belief and not religion’s
extrinsic value that underlies the religion-happiness connection, we
move to the substance of that belief. What sort of conviction begets
happiness—the temperate, flexible faith of the religious liberal or
moderate, or the unbending, confident dogmatism of the
fundamentalist? A growing literature suggests the latter.79 Indeed, not
only does religious doubt neutralize religion’s salutary effect on
happiness, it tends to reverse it.80
The empirical literature reveals an intriguing pattern—the religionhappiness relationship appears to be non-linear.81 More religion, it
77
See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103–04
(“Studies of denominational growth and decline have distinguished between ‘strong’ and
‘weak’ denominations on the basis of their respective levels of internal pluralism,
distinctiveness of lifestyle, social action, evangelism (sense of mission), ecumenicism, and
other denominational traits.”). “‘[S]trong’ or conservative churches [demand] high levels
of loyalty and social solidarity, [] disciplining both beliefs and lifestyle, and [] fostering
dogmatic absolutism.” Id. (citations omitted).
78
See supra Part III.B (explaining that strong conviction begets happiness).
79
See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 80 (describing the link between fundamentalism and
well-being). Weber describes this link as follows:
[S]trength of conviction, be it atheistic or religious, correlates with
improved psychological health.
Degree of inner conviction is
associated with degree of well-being: for example, strong atheistic
beliefs are comparable to strong religious beliefs in helping people
cope with the challenges of aging []. Christians with high levels of
religious saliency have significantly lower levels of depressive
symptoms.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note
36, at 117 (finding important net effects of devotional intensity); see, e.g., Abdel-Khalek,
supra note 68, at 87 (“[P]eople, who are religiously devout and committed to their
tradition, . . . tend to enjoy better health both physical[ly] and mental[ly].” (citations
omitted)); Hayward & Elliott, supra note 32, at 593 (“Having more orthodox religious
beliefs has also been shown to be associated with better outcomes in terms of psychological
well-being . . . ”).
80
See Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, supra note 31, at 121 (“[A]lthough most work on
religion and health has focused on salutary effects on health, there is now evidence that
certain facets of religious engagement—termed ‘spiritual struggles’—can undermine health
and well-being.”).
81
See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 80 (examining the connection between lower levels
of religious certainty and decreased well-being). Weber explains:
Just as greater conviction correlates with better health, less certainty of
belief has been associated with decreased well-being. Religious
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seems, does not necessarily make a happy believer.82 Indeed, the
religion-happiness connection appears to be “curvilinear,” with
happiness declining as religiosity initially increases and rising after
religiosity exceeds a certain threshold.83 While religious fundamentalists
tend to be highest on the happiness continuum, religious liberals and
moderates appear not to be any happier than agnostics.84 Perhaps most

adherents with low certainty of belief may be less happy than nonbelievers, with 47.3% of religious respondents to an online study
reportedly less happy than atheists, 21.9% less happy than agnostics,
and 14.4% less happy than those with no religious affiliation.
Id. (citation omitted).
82
See Marta Elliott & R. David Hayward, Religion and Life Satisfaction Worldwide: The Role
of Government Regulation, 70 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 285, 288 (2009) (“[I]n certain instances,
religiosity is actually harmful to psychological well-being. . . . [A] U-shaped relationship
between religious salience and depression, indicating that those who felt their religion was
‘not too important’ or ‘very important’ report higher levels of depression than those in
between the two extremes. . . . [T]hose who were not at all religious or very religious had
lower levels of depression than those found in the middle . . . ”) (citations omitted); see also
Mochon et al., supra note 59, at 2 (“While those who believe strongly are very happy, those
who believe weakly are less happy and may even be hurt by their affiliation [with] a
religious group.”).
83
See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 675 (“[T]he highest levels of distress [were] in the
weakly religious; the highly religious as well as the non-religious were the least
distressed.”). Galen and Kloet elaborate:
In a sample of German adults, a curvilinear relationship was found
between religiosity and depression with both the strictly religious and
‘determined atheists’ scoring as the least depressed. . . . Similarly,
[researchers have] found a curvilinear relationship between religious
conviction and depression.
Certainty of beliefs (either strong
religiousness or confident non-religiousness) was associated with
better mental and physical health . . . Several other authors have also
found complex curvilinear relationships between religiosity and
mental health by clearly separating the weakly religious and
completely non-religious.
Id. (citations omitted).
84
See id. at 681 (analyzing the link between strength of religious beliefs and emotional
stability). This link is described as follows:
Similar to previous literature, those with more certain religious beliefs,
either strong belief in God or strong lack of belief in God, had greater
emotional stability than those with weak or unsure beliefs. Those
highest in life satisfaction were both the strong believers and the strong
non-believers, with the uncertain scoring intermediately.
The
regression analysis demonstrated that, although some demographic or
social covariates (sex, age, social contacts, and perceived social
support), are also related to emotional stability, the curvilinear
function of certainty of belief remained after controlling for these
covariates and contributed small but significant incremental
prediction.
Id. Mochon expands on this link:
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revealing, atheists tend to be higher on the happiness scale than do
religious liberals and moderates, although their happiness levels do not
quite rise to the level of fundamentalists.85
Still, religious moderation does not entail religious doubt; nor does
religious fundamentalism entail religious certainty. We should not
assume that religious liberals and moderates are uniformly uncertain of
their convictions while atheists and fundamentalists are monolithically
free of doubt. Nonetheless, the evidence supports the natural intuition
that, while the dogmatic Unitarian and the doubt-ridden fundamentalist
exist, they are rare breeds indeed.86 As such, there is scant evidence from
which to glean any conclusions regarding the primacy of epistemological
certainty over denominational ties or vice versa. Nonetheless, research
that more directly assesses the impact of doubt on happiness confirms its
The most fervent believers clearly benefit from their religious
affiliation. People with religiosity levels of six and seven reported
significantly higher well-being than the reference group (those with
religiosity of one). However, people with levels of four and five
showed no benefit over the least religious people in our sample, and in
fact, people with moderate to low adherence (those with levels of two
and three) showed a significantly negative effect of religiosity. Thus[,]
while religious involvement clearly benefits some (the most fervent
believers) it can also be detrimental to others.
Mochon et al., supra note 59, at 8.
85
See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 685 (“[T]hose with high certainty of non-belief had
greater mental well-being than those with moderate or unsure beliefs. . . . [T]hose with
confident religious belief and disbelief reporting higher mental well-being than the
uncertain believers. Those non-religious subgroups with more definitive self-labels (atheist
and humanist) had greater well-being than the self-labels associated with less categorical
non-belief (agnostic, spiritual).”); Hwang, supra note 74, at 613 (“[I]nvestigators have found
that strong atheists are no more likely to be depressed than strong believers, and are less
depressed than weak believers or wavering agnostics.” (citations omitted)). Other scholars
suggest that:
Were we to place our own children in the distribution of religiosity, the
option with the highest expected well-being would entail enrolling
them and encouraging them to believe strongly; were we not certain
that our children would attain sufficient levels of belief, however, we
might prefer them to remain unaffiliated. Indeed, the non-linear
relation between religiosity and well-being suggests that many
moderate believers would benefit from reducing their level of
religiosity rather than increasing it.
Mochon et al., supra note 59, at 10–12.
86
See Jenny L. Small & Nicholas A. Bowman, Religious Commitment, Skepticism, and
Struggle Among U.S. College Students: The Impact of Majority/Minority Religious Affiliation and
Institutional Type, 50 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 154, 158 (2011) (“Unitarians, Jews, and
students with no religious affiliation score highly on a measure of religious skepticism,
whereas Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, and ‘other Christians’ score much
lower.”). See generally PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY 1 (2007) (presenting survey responses to the question “All in all, are you satisfied or
dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?”).
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corrosive influence.87 Persistent doubt tends to reverse religion’s
generally salubrious effect on happiness.88 The doubt-plagued report a
higher incidence of anxiety and depression, evince more negative affect,
and experience diminished feelings of satisfaction and purpose relative
to more stalwart believers.89 She who seeks happiness, it seems, should
opt for resolute faith or confident non-belief. Nuance and flexibility, an
87
See Gauthier et al., supra note 74, at 141 (“[R]eligious doubt was negatively correlated
with positive affect, and positively correlated to depression, suggesting that religious
doubt does not display any visible benefits to mental health.”); Neal Krause & Christopher
G. Ellison, A Longitudinal Study of the Precipitants and Consequences of Religious Doubt in Older
Adults, 48 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 293, 293 (2009) (“[G]reater religious certainty is
associated with greater happiness and greater life satisfaction.”); Weber et al., supra note 34,
at 73 (“Religious doubt and feelings of alienation from God have been associated with
increased depressive symptoms.” (citations omitted)).
Ellison and his colleagues
summarize previous findings as follows:
Ellison [] showed that the absence of doubts—which he characterized
as ‘existential certainty’—was positively associated with life
satisfaction and happiness in a cross-sectional probability sample of
U.S. adults. . . . Krause and associates [] found that religious doubts
were linked with both positive and depressed affect (in opposite
directions). . . . Krause and Wulff [] showed that religious doubting
was associated with lower levels of satisfaction with health, as well as
higher levels of distress. . . . Galek and colleagues [] examined data
from a nationwide online survey, finding that religious doubts were
positively related to symptoms of a number of mental health
problems . . . including depression, anxiety, phobia, paranoia, and
hostility. . . . [O]ur results confirm several robust associations between
religious doubts and poor sleep quality. These associations persist
despite controls for an array of sociodemographic and behavioral
covariates, including age, mental and physical health, stressful life
events, attendance at religious services, frequency of prayer, and
attachment to God.
Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, supra note 31, at 122–23, 130 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Neil
Krause et al., Aging, Religious Doubt, and Psychological Well-Being, 39 GERONTOLOGIST 525,
532 (1999) [hereinafter Krause, Aging] (“[R]eligious doubt is associated with greater
depressive symptomatology and less positive affect.”).
88
See Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 39 (“[I]f people are more deeply immersed in
religion, and they seriously question their faith, then the effects of doubt are likely to be
more consequential.”). “[T]hose who occupy formal roles in the church should be more
troubled by religious doubts because doubt threatens roles and identities that are highly
salient to them.” Id. at 40; see Weber et al., supra note 34, at 73 (“Religious doubt [] and
feelings of alienation from God [] have been associated with increased depressive
symptoms.” (citations omitted)).
89
See Ellison et al., Religious Resources, supra note 18, at 290 (“[U]nresolved doubts can be
profoundly disconcerting for religious adherents. Doubts can deprive the individual of a
coherent religious belief system and sense of coherence, which otherwise provides a means
of interpreting and assigning meaning to daily affairs and personal crises alike.”).
“[R]eligious doubts are associated with elevated levels of psychological distress and
psychiatry symptoms, and inversely associated with life satisfaction and other indicators of
well-being.” Id. (citations omitted).
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earnest attempt to marry faith and free inquiry—these may be the
hallmarks of the mature, enlightened believer. But they do not appear to
light the path to happiness.
These findings accord with the theoretical literature discussed above.
While the comparatively tepid faith of mainline denominations demands
less of and more readily forgives its followers, such elasticity comes at
the price of epistemological order.90 Whereas the more zealous faith of
the religiously devout accords its devotees a comprehensive
epistemological architecture with which to interpret phenomena, the
faith of the epistemologically unsure is more scaffolding than solid
edifice—a general framework perhaps, but riddled with gaps and
vulnerabilities.91 As discussed above, attachment and ETAS theorists
posit that human beings seek stability and security in a perilous,
uncertain world.92 Inasmuch as religious certainty satisfies our basic
desire for order and coherence, it should make us less anxiety-prone,
more optimistic, and better able to function in daily life. The empirical

90
See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103
(“Religious experience and/or personal faith—devotional intensity—may facilitate a
comprehensive interpretive framework through which the individual can make sense of
the totality of human existence and its vicissitudes.”).
91
Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 82. “The literature on contemporary
patterns of denominational growth and decline distinguishes between ‘strong’ conservative
Protestant groups and ‘weak’ mainline and liberal Protestant churches.” “[Strong
denominations] require higher levels of organizational commitment and social
solidarity. . . . distinctive lifestyles and behavioral conformity.” Id. “[T]hey foster
absolutism and ideological closure rather than pluralism and tolerance, [and as such] are
more effective than weaker churches in sustaining coherent systems of religious meaning.”
Id. (citations omitted); see Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 686 (examining the relationship
between mental health and religious involvement). Galen & Kloet describe this
relationship as follows:
Rather than specifically religious content being a prerequisite for
mental well-being, it is likely that existential certainty or coherence of a
worldview mediates the relationship between religious participation
and mental health. For example, system justification theory, the belief
in a just world, and terror management theory all suggest that
ideological confidence in a coherent worldview may buffer anxiety,
and that religious belief may assist in increasing this
confidence . . . . Conversely, doubting one’s worldview is associated
with higher distress.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gribbins & Vandenberg, supra note 53, at 106–07 (“[Religion]
is in essence a ‘meta-belief’ or worldview. This worldview provides an absolute
foundation for determining what is and what should be, what is good and evil, and what is
known and unknowable, which are conferred by an omniscient, omnipotent being.”
(citations omitted)).
92
See supra Part II.A (explaining that humans seek to neutralize external threats by
cultivating an attachment with God).
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evidence corroborates this intuition.93 Religious doubt, by contrast,
erodes the epistemological anchor that religion provides. It creates
lacunas in an interpretive framework that for fundamentalists operates
as a ready, comprehensive guide to an unstable universe.94 As such,
attachment and ETAS theories predict precisely the results recounted
above—albeit with two notable caveats. First, ETAS theory predicts that
religion should yield psychological benefits only when it neutralizes
threats to human welfare.95 A capricious, vindictive God should
generate the opposite effect, a point this Article will address later.96
The second caveat is more complicated—at first blush, attachment
and ETAS theories do not account for the contented atheist. Why should
belief in the non-existence of God buoy one against the hazards and
uncertainties of human existence? Although empirical work on the
belief systems of atheists is sparse, it seems clear that atheists are
generally not devoid of conviction.97 Many have highly developed
worldviews that they embrace as unreservedly as the fundamentalist

93
See Elliott & Hayward, supra note 82, at 287–88 (“[A] sense of a direct connection with
the divine was associated with greater life satisfaction.”); Ellison et al., Religious Doubts,
supra note 31, at 123 (“[R]eligious doubts can result in feelings of powerlessness,
hopelessness, worry and fear, which may in turn trigger the release of stress hormones that
promote mental and physiological arousal.” (citations omitted)); Thurow, supra note 25
(“[S]tudies [have found] support for the notion that a close relationship to God (or a higher
source) positively relates to health and well-being . . . ”).
94
See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 82 (“A leading proponent of this
view is Berger, who argues that religion offers a comprehensive framework for the
ordering and interpretation of human events. Thus, in the context of strong beliefs
regarding matters of ultimate concern, seemingly routine personal affairs may take on
particular meaning and significance.”).
95
See supra Part II.A (explaining how a loving God offers safety and stability).
96
See infra Part VI (explaining the reliance of the poor and uneducated on religion).
97
See Jonathan Morgan, Untangling False Assumptions Regarding Atheism and Health, 48
ZYGON 9, 15 (2013) (“[P]erhaps the strongest critique of this link between health and belief
is the paucity of research on nonbelievers.” (citation omitted)). “[A]theists are [] more
prone to find their meaning in ‘this world.’ [Many] have argued that secular nonbelievers
‘have a stronger sense of social justice than do religious individuals.’” Id. at 14 (citation
omitted). Hwang suggests that:
[Conventional] measures are unable to reliably distinguish between
individuals with affirmatively secular worldviews and those believers
whose belief systems are vague, transitory[,] or conflicted. . . . [W]e
encourage further investigation of the medical and psychosocial assets
of affirmatively secular individuals (as opposed to the ‘nonreligious’).
Particularly relevant are studies identifying the strengths and benefits
associated with an explicitly secular world view, especially the ways in
which a secular world view can enhance a person’s overall health and
quality of life.
Hwang, supra note 74, at 612, 617.
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does scripture.98 To the extent this holds true, the happy atheist is
explicable from an attachment standpoint—as with the fundamentalist, a
comprehensive ideational framework offers a buffer against moral and
intellectual chaos.99 ETAS theory provides little insight here, however—
that is, unless the atheist’s worldview involves some threat-neutralizing
mechanism, which seems doubtful. In any case, we need not rely on
attachment or ETAS theories to explain the happy atheist—or for that
matter, the curvilinear relationship between religion and happiness.
Indeed, the theory of cognitive dissonance illuminates these
phenomena.100
The human aversion to cognitive dissonance more directly accounts
both for the contended atheist and for the curvilinear relationship
between religion and happiness.101 Where agnostics and religious
moderates often remain stranded between the poles of faith and nonbelief, atheists and fundamentalists need not endure this psychic
struggle.102 They can rest comfortably at one extreme or the other,
sparing themselves the energy and anguish that come with efforts to
harmonize beliefs or behaviors.103 They avoid the moral and intellectual
limbo to which a more nuanced stance might condemn them.
Reconciling these findings with terror management theory sheds
valuable light on the psychological advantages of epistemological
certainty. From a terror management standpoint, the curvilinear
relationship between religion and happiness and the phenomenon of the

98
See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 675 (“Those with a self-identity as atheists may
focus more on a narrower rejection of religious claims but others who self-identify as
secular humanists may also include affirmations of human progress or growth.” (citation
omitted)).
99
See id. at 686 (“It may be the case that confidently non-religious individuals have a
committed worldview, with meaning derived from relationships, science, philosophy, or
the arts in an analogous way to a religious individual deriving meaning from religious
beliefs.”).
100
See supra Part II.C (explaining the theory of cognitive dissonance).
101
See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 674 (“Holding beliefs with strong conviction may
itself exert a salutary effect and reduce anxiety caused by cognitive dissonance. For
example, in the absence of subjective certainty, people often experience a state of
psychological aversion that they are motivated to reduce.”).
102
See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 82 (“Interestingly, there appears to be a correlation
between strength of conviction in one’s religious (or nonreligious) worldview and
psychological well-being. This correlation is supported by findings connecting greater
existential certainty with decreased depressive symptoms.” (citations omitted)).
103
See id. at 83 (“[A] bimodal relationship [appears to exist] between religiosity and
health, with the greatest health experienced by the most and least religious
individuals. . . . [S]trong atheists appear to enjoy the same psychological benefits as
strongly religious individuals.”).
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happy atheist may seem anomalous.104 Insofar as agnosticism and
moderate religiosity allow for the possibility—if not the probability—of
immortality, they should allay rather than intensify our terror of death.
As such, terror management theory would predict a linear relationship
between religion and happiness. But here we must recall that the human
desire for immortality is not confined to immortality in the conventional
religious or celestial sense.105 Rather, our dread of death engenders a
more general impetus toward meaning and permanence.106 If atheists
are more likely than agnostics or religious moderates to develop
comprehensive worldviews—in the form of a resolute commitment to
secular humanism or scientific thinking, for example—then terror
management theory would predict a decline in happiness as one initially
ascends the religiosity scale, followed by a rise as comprehensive
worldviews reemerge at a certain religiosity threshold. Such worldviews
come with ideals that outlast the individual and imbue her with
meaning, purpose, and a sense of permanence in the face of her
mortality.107 To undermine them is to erode a powerful buffer against
our terror of death.
IV. CUES TO DOUBT: DISSONANT STIMULI AND CHALLENGES TO
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CERTAINTY
How do we preserve this powerful psychological palliative when the
world constantly besets us with reminders of the cracks in our
epistemological armor? We observe that others manage to resist our
systems of meaning and belief, that they embrace diametrically opposed
worldviews, and that the world is full of uncomfortable facts that throw

104
See supra Part II.B (discussing the theory that belief in an afterlife conduces the
happiness).
105
See id. (explaining that people seek meaning and performance from their belief
systems generally, regardless of whether their belief systems are religious in nature).
106
See Morris & McAdie, supra note 33, at 116 (“Terror Management Theory (TMT) states
that humans have a very deep fear of death and have created ‘cultural world views’ such as
belief in the afterlife (BA) to control this anxiety. TMT has been supported by research
which shows that subjects will score higher on a BA scale following exposure to a death
threat condition.” (citation omitted)).
107
See Julie Juola Exline, Stumbling Blocks on the Religious Road: Fractured Relationships,
Nagging Vices, and the Inner Struggle to Believe, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 182, 186 (2002)
(“Religious beliefs help people to make sense of the world and to find a sense of meaning
or purpose in existence. In fact, this meaning-making aspect of religion seems to be one the
major mediators of the association between religion and health.” (citation omitted)); supra
Part II.B (explaining that, when faced with mortality, people have a strong desire to
reinforce their cultural and political values).
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our epistemologies into chaos. How do we cope with external cues to
doubt our convictions?108
If epistemological certainty underlies the religion-happiness nexus,
we would expect such cues to attenuate that nexus. The evidence indeed
suggests that such stimuli weaken, destroy, or even reverse religion’s
salutary effect on happiness. Researchers have found, for instance, that
the religion-happiness nexus all but evaporates in comparatively
irreligious societies, where the faithless appear to be roughly as
contented as the faithful.109 In this same vein, religious diversity appears
to undermine the relationship between religion and happiness.110 The
following section elaborates on the role that conformity with social
norms plays in the religion-happiness nexus.
A. A Conformity Effect?
Might these findings reveal a simple conformity effect? That is,
might the religion-happiness nexus owe to the comfort of knowing that
one is not alone or aberrant, such that the roots of the nexus are external
to epistemology?111 This appears unlikely. Indeed, it seems more
108
See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1316 (“Festinger posited that, to reduce
dissonance, one may change one’s own behavior, change one’s environment, or most
drastically, change the very cognition (i.e., belief or opinion) that is in conflict with the
behavior or the environment[.]” (footnote omitted)); Bertram Gawronski, Back to the Future
of Dissonance Theory: Cognitive Consistency as a Core Motive, 30 SOC. COGNITION 652, 653
(2012) (“[I]nconsistency serves as an epistemic cue for errors in one’s system of beliefs,
thereby imposing a ubiquitous constraint on thinking and reasoning that goes far beyond
the well-known demonstrations of dissonance-related attitude change.”).
109
See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1289 (“Our analyses suggest that individual
religiosity is most beneficial to [subjective well-being] when it is congruent with the
culture, that is, if religion is widespread in the society. Where organized religiosity is in the
minority, religiosity does not have a clear benefit for [subjective well-being].”); Adam
Okulicz-Kozaryn, Does Religious Diversity Make Us Unhappy?, 14 MENTAL HEALTH,
RELIGION & CULTURE 1063, 1063, 1070 (2011) (“Religious people are happier than
nonreligious people in religious countries, but not necessarily in non-religious
countries. . . . People like to live among like-minded individuals—religion provide[s] social
identity—and the need to belong is one of the most fundamental human needs.” (citations
omitted)).
110
See Okulicz-Kozaryn, supra note 109, at 1064 (“[R]eligious diversity makes us
unhappy. . . . Religious diversity retards church participation, and church participation is
the form of religiosity that contributes most to well-being, because it promotes social
capital.” (citations omitted)).
111
See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 590 (considering the effect of religious cultures on life
satisfaction). One scholar suggests that:
[P]eople tend to experience life-satisfaction enhancing effects when
they place higher importance in god while living in a country where
attendance of religious services is higher. These findings suggest that
positive effects of religiosity may not be intrinsic. For the countries
sampled, people do not appear to be happier, because they,
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probable that conformity reinforces epistemological certainty, which in
turn promotes happiness. Recall the curvilinear relationship between
religion and happiness.112 Americans evidently do not hold those at the
extremes of the belief spectrum—those who appear to occupy the upper
strata of the happiness continuum—in particularly high esteem. Atheists
in particular are the objects of perhaps uniquely powerful scorn, yet they
appear relatively contented.113 Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses are
hardly comfortable within the mainstream, yet these groups excel at
attaining happiness.114
These realities belie the conformity hypothesis. It is worth noting,
however, that any analysis of a potential conformity effect requires that
we first identify the relevant unit to which the individual would feel
pressure to conform. Society at large may not be the appropriate metric.
Rather, atheists and devout believers might inhabit social circles to
whose norms they faithfully conform—circles whose approbation they
seek far more keenly than that of mainstream society.
Ultimately, we may be able to trace the religion-happiness nexus to
the effects of both epistemological certainty and conformity.115 Perhaps
individually, are more religious.
People who place a higher
importance in god, however, are happier when they live in a country
where others do as well. . . . [I]t appears to be that happiness through
religiosity can mainly be derived through conforming to the standard
in their country—in particular the visible standard.
Id.
112
See supra Part III.B (explaining that atheists and individuals with extreme religious
beliefs are happier than those who experience significant epistemological doubt).
113
See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 81 (“In response to a nationwide telephone survey, a
large number of Americans stated that they were likely to disapprove of their children
marrying atheists, and many felt that atheists were the group ‘ . . . least likely to share their
vision of American society.’” (citation omitted)).
“One [study] indicated
that . . . disapproval placed atheists at the top of Americans’ list of problematic groups,
representing levels of public rejection higher than that of Muslims in post-9/11 America.”
Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
114
See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 91 (“With regard to the Mormons
and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the pattern of results is consistent with recent research on other
aspects of well-being.”). “It seems likely that conformity to the distinctive lifestyle
demands of these groups . . . may reduce the occurrence of health problems, interpersonal
and familial tensions, and other personal stressors.” Id.
115
See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103 (“[T]he
religious community may serve as a ‘plausibility structure.’ Ideation and activity may be
dialectically related, with religious participation reinforcing and solidifying individual
religious convictions and the subjective interpretations of personal experiences.” (citation
omitted)). According to Robert Higgs:
[A]s people internalize ‘the values and precepts of their communities
of shared belief, [they] not only feel better about themselves but
become trustworthy adherents who will act in accordance with their
ideology without, or even in opposition to, external material
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we cannot even disentangle the two. Conformity might reinforce
epistemological certainty, for the conformer need not cope with the
disquieting presence of so many heretics in her midst.
But
epistemological certainty might also strengthen a sense of conformity to
prevailing norms.116 Researchers have not yet squarely attempted to
disaggregate these variables and determine which more proximally
impacts happiness.
Still, there is compelling evidence that
epistemological certainty positively affects happiness, and the possibility
of an alternative explanation—in particular one that dovetails with an
epistemological certainty effect—does not negate the force of that
evidence.
B. Conformity as Plausibility
Here, it is worth returning to the hypothesis that the religionhappiness connection owes predominantly to the social connections that
religious involvement facilitates. I asserted earlier that, in light of the
finding that extrinsic religiosity does not correlate with happiness, this
theory likely misconceives the role of social ties in the religion-happiness
calculus.117 It seems more probable that such connections function as
“plausibility structures,” ratifying one’s epistemology through the
enticement,’ a state of being which provides even greater self-esteem.
The social isolation of ideologically homogenous groups ultimately
produces extralegal cooperation and allows these groups to produce
collective benefits not otherwise available.
Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1314 (footnote omitted). See also Hayward & Elliott, supra
note 32, at 604 (“[T]here is strong support for the idea that being similar to other members
of one’s religious groups . . . is beneficial for individual well-being . . . . This holds up for
demographic characteristics, religious values and preferences, devotional behavior, and
participation within the congregation.”). “[T]he number of other members in the same
congregation who checked the same values as important was a strong predictor of both the
degree to which an individual’s spiritual needs were met and the amount of help provided
by religion in daily life.” Id.
116
See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1314 (“[P]eople internalize ‘the values and
precepts of their communities of shared belief, they not only feel better about themselves
but become trustworthy adherents who will act in accordance with their ideology . . . .’”
(footnote omitted)); Krause and Wulff, supra note 44, at 39 (“[S]hared behavioral
expectations associated with social roles promote a sense of meaning and purpose in life.
This function is important because research consistently shows that a life that is
experienced as meaningful is an important precursor to well-being.” (citations omitted)).
See also Krause & Ellison, supra note 87, at 296 (“An individual’s confidence in religious
explanations is strengthened to the extent that others express their confidence in them.”
(citation omitted)).
117
See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 89 (“[W]hereas most previous
research in this area focused on church attendance and private devotion, the pattern of
results presented here suggests that these aspects of religiosity contribute to well-being
indirectly, for the most part, by strengthening religious beliefs and world views.”).
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collective assent of one’s peers.118 External cues to doubt one’s
epistemology—religious diversity or prevalent unbelief, for instance—
open fissures in these plausibility structures, attenuating the religionSee Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 115 (“[The
results suggested] the relative primacy of those religious factors that are not specific to any
one particular denomination or sect. However, two denominations are exceptions[]:
Southern Baptist and ‘Other Baptist.’”). “The persistent importance of membership in the
Southern Baptists, the sole fundamentalist denomination identifiable from these data, may
be best interpreted in light . . . of religious ‘plausibility structures’ . . . The link between the
strong plausibility structure of more conservative denominations and well-being
may . . . diminish existential ambiguity or ambivalence[.]” Id. at 115–16. Ellison also states:
Coherent religious belief systems can shape one’s fundamental
assumptions about the world and one’s place within it. Such religious
plausibility structures often provide an organizing principle via which
one conducts routine affairs, defines role and performs responsibilities,
and nurtures relationships. Thus, religious meaning systems may
provide toolkits with which individuals make sense of daily events,
major life changes, and traumatic crises.
Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, supra note 31, at 122 (citations omitted); see also HarmerDionne, supra note 48, at 1317 (“When in disagreement with others, one tends to reject
those with whom one disagrees and seek out those who share similar cognitions. This
social support, on an immediate level, tends to block the discomfort produced by
dissonance with the larger society.” (footnote omitted)). See Ellison et al., Does Religious
Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 104 (“The solidarity and ideological reinforcement
provided by a religious community embodying a relatively distinctive lifestyle and
dogmatic homogeneity may constitute a subculture.”). Ellison and colleagues further state:
In such a context, [the] dialectical relationship between beliefs and
practices may provide a distinctive interpretive [] coherence not found
in other communities. Conversely, to the extent that ‘weak’ churches
(or denominations) are characterized by a tolerance of doctrinal
heterodoxy, internal political dissent, and a pluralism of
lifestyles . . . the absence of precisely such an all-encompassing
interpretive framework seems likely.
Thus, the character of
plausibility structures may vary by denomination.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 81 (“Religious
communities may promote fundamental norms regarding health behaviors, interpersonal
and familial relationships, business dealings, and other dimensions of personal lifestyles
that facilitate well-being. . . . Thus, the experience of worshiping in a group may reinforce
private beliefs and may increase the centrality of religious interpretations of personal life
experiences.”). “[C]hurches and synagogues offer institutional settings and regular
opportunities for social intercourse between persons of like minds and similar values.” Id.
(citations omitted). Theory II states:
The cultural anxiety-buffer is maintained largely through the
consensual validation provided in cultural rituals and informal
interactions with others. When people’s beliefs and evaluations of
themselves are shared by others, it increases the confidence with which
those beliefs and evaluations are held . . . . [W]hen others agree it
provides a high level of consensus for the belief, which implies that the
belief is externally determined and not a result of personal bias or
perspective.
Theory II, supra note 37, at 309 (citations omitted).
118
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happiness connection.119 Here, too, the possibility of a conformity effect
remains—though the role of social ties throws into particularly sharp
relief the futility of disentangling conformity from epistemological
certainty.120 Conformity buttresses epistemological certainty, which, in
turn, bolsters the feeling of conformity.121 Ultimately, the distinction
between epistemological certainty and conformity may be more illusory
than actual.122
V. THE MATURE SKEPTIC: THE GROWTH-DOUBT NEXUS
This Article has attempted to show how epistemological certainty
buoys one against instability and uncertainty, preserves a sense of
ideational coherence, and shields one against the dread of death. But I
must reiterate the caveat I issued earlier—this analysis is not a fullthroated defense of religious or epistemological certainty, but rather a
call to reckon with the perils of doubt.123 Those perils are not dispositive.
119
See Okulicz-Kozaryn, supra note 109, at 1063 (“Religiosity improves well-being by
providing so-called ‘plausibility structures.’” (citation omitted)). Okulicz-Kozaryn further
explains these structures as follows:
Plausibility structure is more fundamental than social capital; it is a
sociocultural context for systems of meanings and beliefs in a
society. . . . People seem to be happiest living among like-minded
others who share similar values and norms. . . . Religions differ in their
explanations of the world, and there arises the question: which
explanation is true?
Id. at 1063–64 (citations omitted).
120
See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 89 (“This study supports the view
that religious symbols and beliefs provide an interpretative framework through which
individuals can make sense of everyday reality.” (citation omitted)). “Further, the overall
pattern of results suggests that the beneficent consequences of religious attendance and
divine relations noted in previous work actually may reflect their roles in the creation and
maintenance of religious plausibility structures.” Id. “[T]his theme has important roots in
classical sociological theory: although Durkheim sometimes is interpreted as suggesting
that religion promotes well-being mainly through social integration, closer examination
clarifies his view that collective religious commitments nurture coherent plausibility
structures[.]” Id. (citation omitted).
121
See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103 (“A
participatory dimension of religiosity may also be positively associated with life
satisfaction . . . [because a religious institution] may provide an institutional setting in
which individuals with shared value orientations can interact[.]”). “[T]he religious
community may serve as a ‘plausibility structure.’ Ideation and activity may be
dialectically related, with religious participation reinforcing and solidifying individual
religious convictions and the subjective interpretations of personal experiences.” Id.
(citation omitted).
122
See Small & Bowman, supra note 86, at 170 (“[R]eligious commitment, religious
engagement, and having friends with similar religious beliefs all build upon and contribute
to one another.”).
123
See supra Part I (maintaining that doubt has many virtues).
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In the final analysis, we must weigh them against the societal toll that
dogmatism exacts. That balance is beyond the scope of this analysis,
which I have confined to the psychological impact of doubt on the
individual. Even from the standpoint of the individual, however, the
discussion thus far has painted an incomplete picture of psychological
health. Are psychological well-being and happiness truly coterminous?
What of personal growth, self-knowledge, and the capacity for
interpersonal understanding? Might epistemological certainty promote
happiness but stunt personal maturation? The evidence furnishes some
support for this proposition.124 I will move now to a discussion of this
growth-happiness divide, but I urge the reader in advance to ponder
whether a society of discontented sophisticates is indeed desirable.
A. The Virtues of Doubt
Liberal theologians and religious philosophers have long averred
that faith and doubt reinforce each other in happy dialectical fashion.125
Faith and doubt, they insist, are not antitheses—for true faith, the faith of
the mature, self-aware believer, positively requires doubt.126 In Paul
Tillich’s articulation, “[d]oubt is not the opposite of faith. It is an
element of faith.”127 The faithful of modern sensibilities exhort us to
attune ourselves to our innermost selves, to grapple with our deepest
124
See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the effects of epistemological certainty on happiness
and personal growth).
125
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 96 (“[S]ome
theologians and researchers maintain that religious doubt should be embraced because it is
the gateway to a deeper and more meaningful faith.”). Krause elaborates:
In fact, some of these scholars argue that doubt is the very essence of
faith itself. This perspective is, perhaps, nowhere more evident than in
the writing of Paul Tillich, who . . . maintained that, ‘Many Christians,
as well as members of other religious groups, feel anxiety, guilt and
despair about what they call ‘loss of faith.’ But serious doubt is
confirmation of faith.’ Similar views are reflected in the work of
Allport . . . . In fact, doubt is considered to be one of the driving forces
behind Fowler’s higher stages of the development of faith.
Id. (citations omitted).
126
See Dale M. Hilty, Religious Belief, Participation and Consequences, An Exploratory and
Confirmatory Analysis, 27 J. FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 243, 244 (1988) (“Allport
suggests that crises can have a positive influence on the evolutionary integration of the
religious experience within the development of the personality.” (citation omitted)).
“[D]oubt is the key stimulus in the individual’s movement from the first stage (i.e., raw
credulity) to the last stage (i.e., mature belief) in Allport’s three stage theory of belief
development.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 37 (“[Many]
scholars maintain that having doubts about religion lies at the very heart of living a
religious life, and that it is not possible to be deeply religious without having doubts about
one’s faith.”).
127
See PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY VOLUME TWO 116 (1957).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 11

186

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

doubts and insecurities.128 In so doing, they insist, we achieve that
rarefied state of serenity and self-knowledge accessible only after
sustained struggle.129
The evidence suggests that religious doubt and struggle may well be
a vehicle for personal growth, the path to a deeper, more complete
Those prone to such struggle report heightened
personhood.130
interpersonal understanding, enhanced tolerance of others, and greater
empathy.131 Some emerge from the crucible of doubt with their faiths
strengthened or reinvigorated, having fended off doubt’s advances.132
128
See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 12 (arguing that effective teaching forces students to
question assumptions); GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS RELIGION 73 (1951)
(“[T]he mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt.”);
Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 106–07 (“Perhaps the
point of wrestling with doubt is not to be content, satisfied, or happy—instead it may
simply be to learn. . . . Maybe the exercise of doubting is sufficient . . . to bring about
desired social aims, and . . . the resolution of ultimate concerns, such as confirming the
existence of God, is beside the point.”).
129
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 96 (examining
the view that doubt is constructive). Krause explains:
[This] view . . . is based on the belief that faith is something that must
be reflected upon and reasoned out. . . .[I]t is not something that is
achieved effortlessly, . . . [but rather something that] must be earned
through an arduous process of deep contemplation as well as
relentless searching and questioning. This view is consistent with
basic principles in developmental psychology, which suggest that
cognitive development is driven by uncertainty and doubt. The
essence of this perspective is reflected in the work of Batson and his
colleagues on the religious quest[, who] maintain that openly and
honestly exploring doubt about religion is beneficial because it
ultimately leads to a deeper and more mature religious faith.
Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he notion that grappling with uncertainty or ambiguity is a
positive force for personal advancement may be found in a number of the classic works on
human development. . . . [I]mages of the positive effects of doubt may be found in
Erikson’s discussion of the final stage of adult development . . . .” Krause et al., Aging,
supra note 87, at 527 (citation omitted).
130
See Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 37 (“More recent support for the notion that
doubt may be beneficial is found in the work of developmental psychologists, who
maintain that growth and cognitive development are driven by doubt and uncertainty.”
(citation omitted)); Morgan, supra note 97, at 12 (“In Maslow’s study of personality
development he reported that nonbelief seemed to be correlated with the highest levels of
development. Sociologists also support this positive view of nonbelievers: the highest
levels of happiness are reported among the most secular nations.” (citations omitted)).
131
See Keith J. Edwards et al., The Multidimensional Structure of the Quest Construct, 39 J. OF
PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 87, 88 (2011) (“[Q]uest scores correlated significantly with
important social variables such as principled moral reasoning, lower levels of racial and
sexual prejudice, and higher levels of helping behavior.” (citation omitted)).
132
See Tiago Baltazar & Ron Coffen, The Role of Doubt in Religious Identity, Development,
and Psychological Maturity, 20 J. OF RES. ON CHRISTIAN EDUC. 182, 183–84 (2011) (“[I]dentity
achievement refers to the state of a person who has both experienced crisis and achieved
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These findings warrant attaching an asterisk to the thesis of this paper,
but they by no means discredit it. This analysis has sought to illuminate
the influence of epistemological certainty on happiness rather than to
assess whether, all things considered, we ought to preserve
epistemological certainty—and the weight of the evidence suggests that,
while religious struggle may aid personal maturation, it does not breed
happiness.133
B. Religion as Quest
Psychologists have operationalized Tillich’s struggle-as-growth
concept with the “religion-as-quest” construct, a measure of the extent to
which one conceives of religion as an internal spiritual journey, a
striving toward truth and understanding.134 Such an orientation
coincides with various benefits—enhanced compassion, greater facility
in social settings, amplified curiosity and zest for intellectual pursuits.135
But the bulk of the evidence suggests that “quest orientation” does not
foster happiness; to the contrary, it correlates with anxiety, depression,
and negative affect.136 It appears that the thirst for truth and selfcommitment based on the individual’s own choosing. . . . Achieved people exhibit lower
levels of anxiety and higher levels of self-esteem.”). “Research concerning religious
identity development shows that doubt is a catalyst for identity achievement. . . . [D]oubt
increases higher-order executive processes [] to attain a self-drive for an individual who
has a solid knowledge basis and can commit to certain religious principles.” Id. at 187–88
(citations omitted).
133
See Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 38 (“But just because doubt may lead to insight,
growth, and development, does not necessarily mean that it comes without a price. In fact,
there are at least four reasons why the ‘dark nights of the soul’ that arise from wrestling
with doubt may be a source of significant distress.”). Studies suggest “strong, churchbased, social ties are associated with better health. But if individuals begin to question
their faith, conflict may arise with church members who still adhere closely to their
beliefs. . . . [Further,] rejecting beliefs that have been endorsed previously may lead to
feelings of guilt and shame.” Id. (citations omitted). “Although most work on religion and
health has focused on the positive effects on health, there is now evidence that certain
facets of religious engagement—termed ‘spiritual struggles’—can be detrimental to health
and well-being, leading to depression and anxiety.” Id. (citations omitted).
134
See Keith A. Puffer, Social Personality Traits as Salient Predictors of Religious Doubt
Phenomena Among Undergraduates, 41 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 229, 229 (2013) (describing
the elements of a “religion-as-quest” orientation).
135
See id. at 231 (“[S]tudies have revealed QRO as being positively associated with social
justice actions among African-Americans, racial openness, responsible sexual behavior, and
an unselfish love style.” (citations omitted)). “[The] results reveal adept social intelligence
and assertive leadership as predictive of ‘openness, curiosity, and effort,’ qualities of
individuals engaged in ‘a continual search for more light on religious questions.’” Id. at
236 (citations omitted).
136
See id. at 231 (“Regarding intrapersonal functioning, quest religiosity positively related
to mental health concerns such as worry and stomach pain, identity distress, and personal
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knowledge, so assiduously cultivated by our institutions of higher
learning, comes at the price of psychic tranquility.137
Nonetheless, many religious adherents manage to integrate struggle
and doubt into strong, vibrant faiths. Theirs is a sophisticated, mature
religion, the sort Tillich exalts as the quintessence of genuine faith. But
the composition of this group is revealing. The well-educated and
financially secure excel at this melding of faith and doubt, while the less
fortunate languish in a disorienting limbo.138 Is epistemological doubt a
luxury of the well-off?139 Does it exact a peculiarly heavy toll on the
most vulnerable among us?
distress. QRO also negatively associated to positive affect, satisfaction with life, and
overall college adjustment.” (citations omitted)).
137
See Krause et al., Aging, supra note 87, at 532 (considering the possibility that spiritual
struggles sap one’s energy). These scholars suggest:
[T]he attainment of wisdom may not come with ease and even though
working through doubts and ambiguities eventually reduces negative
psychological states, these gains may also incur certain costs. It is
interesting to note that two of the four items in our positive affect scale
deal with having pep and energy. Perhaps grappling with doubt
reduces feelings of depression, but extracts a price at the same time by
draining psychic energies.
Id. “Although anxiety, depression, and religious disinterest associate with quest religiosity,
social savvy predicted QRO. Put simply, questers can possess mature social personality
features—a social sophistication. Empathy [] empowers them to communicate efficiently,
to discern the thoughts of others, and to feel affective reactions of others.” Puffer, supra
note 134, at 235 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Ronald C. Jones, The Instructor’s Challenge:
Moving Students Beyond Opinions to Critical Thinking, FACULTY FOCUS (July 29, 2013),
available
at
http://www.facultyfocus.com/articles/effective-teaching-strategies/theinstructors-challenge-moving-students-beyond-opinions-to-critical-thinking/, archived at
http://perma.cc/7B7D-7VTS (arguing that teachers must challenge their students’ views
and push them to think critically).
138
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 97 (“And the
resources that are at an individual’s disposal should play a major role in shaping how
doubt is handled.”). Krause elaborates:
[E]ducation is one such resource. . . . Because education develops the
ability to gather and interpret information and to solve problems on
many levels, it increases control over events and outcomes in
life. . . . In contrast to those with a good education, older people with
less schooling are likely to lack the skills needed to grapple with and
resolve doubt. . . . [R]epeated episodes of unsuccessful encounters
with [doubt] are likely to spark negative emotions, such as feelings of
frustration, confusion, and bewilderment. . . . This may ultimately lead
some older people to feel they are unable to control core aspects of
their lives. This is important because research done in secular settings
has shown that diminished feelings of self-esteem and personal control
are associated with greater psychological distress.
Id. at 97–98 (citations omitted).
139
See Schwadel, supra note 6, at 179 (“[H]ighly educated Americans often disassociate
from organized religion and instead rely on alternative meaning systems provided by
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VI. PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: RELIGION AS PALLIATIVE
The thesis of this analysis—that epistemological certainty underpins
the religion-happiness connection—is subject to the caveat that such
certainty must buoy and uplift the individual.
An unwavering
conviction that God takes painful vengeance on the wayward tends not
to confer happiness, however convinced one might be of its rectitude.
Belief in a vindictive or capricious God correlates with depression,
anxiety, guilt, and negative affect.140 Such an effect is far closer to
Freud’s bleak conception of religion than to the contemporary view of
religion as salutary. It is not enough that one believe resolutely—one
must believe correctly.141
This poses a particularly formidable challenge for the poor and
uneducated, whose surrounding environments plunge their
epistemologies into disarray.142 Their conditions bring an onslaught of
uncomfortable stimuli and contradictions—why such poverty and
squalor when some live in abundance? Why does misfortune befall the
worthy and unworthy alike? How can God abide such a state of
affairs?143
science.”); see also Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1278 (“[P]eople in the wealthiest nations
tend to be leaving organized religion or have no specific religious affiliation. This exiting
from organized religion is most pronounced in Northern Europe and in many other highly
economically developed nations.” (citation omitted)).
140
See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 73 (“Negative religious coping (i.e., a punishing God,
demonic reprisals) is associated with lower quality of life and increased depression”
(citations omitted)).
141
See Gawronski, supra note 108, at 659 (examining the effect on well-being of
consistency in one’s convictions). Gawronski argues that:
[C]onsistency is not a motivational force in itself, but the accidental
outcome of epistemic processes that aim at validating propositions that
are
desired
and
invalidating
propositions
that
are
undesired . . . . Specifically, consistency should elicit positive feelings
when it validates a desired belief, . . . negative feelings when it
invalidates a desired belief, but positive feelings when it invalidates an
undesired belief. . . . [An] illustrative example is the tendency to
justify the current social order even if the status quo goes against one’s
personal interests. A common finding in the literature on system
justification is that the members of disadvantaged groups often adopt
a negative stereotypical view of their in-group, thereby protecting their
beliefs about the fairness of the current social structure.
Id. at 659, 661 (citations omitted).
142
See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1279 (“[W]hen people face problems that push them
to their limits . . . religion offers a number of aids: spiritual support, ultimate explanation,
a sense of larger, benevolent, forces at work in the universe, and a purpose in life that holds
sacred significance.” (citations omitted)).
143
See Krause et al., Aging, supra note 87, at 526 (“[I]t may be difficult for a person to
believe in a loving and protecting God while at the same time recognizing that there is a
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To quiet these nagging questions, the poor and uneducated turn
disproportionately to religion.144 Though here a note is in order on the
complex relationship between strength of conviction and external cues to
doubt, a subject addressed earlier.145 If external cues to doubt undermine
epistemological certainty, we would expect the disquieting
contradictions that confront the poor to dampen faith. Instead, the
poor’s travails engender a more steadfast religiosity.146 Here, it is worth
reviving the subject of cognitive dissonance.147 Such dissonance can
enervate systems of meaning and belief, casting them into a perpetual
limbo between faith and doubt. But it might also force a retrenchment,
as the believer cleaves ever more tightly to her beleaguered faith.148
great deal of suffering, pain, and injustice in the world.”). “[T]he presence of pain, evil,
and suffering in the world serves to tax the faith of some individuals significantly.” Id. at
525 (citation omitted).
144
See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1278 (“[D]eclines in religiosity are associated with
economic growth.”). Some scholars maintain that:
When people are frequently faced with hunger, illness, crime, and
poor education—all of which are relatively more uncontrollable and
more prevalent in poor societies—religion can perhaps make a greater
contribution to well-being. . . . [T]he correlations between difficult
circumstances and religiosity are associated at the individual level []
and country level [], suggesting that difficult circumstances lead to
greater religiosity. This trend was consistent with that found in the
U.S. data and reveals the strong tendency for nations with worse living
circumstances to be more religious and for nations with relatively
better conditions to be less religious.
Id. at 1278, 1284. Hayward and Elliott elaborate:
[T]here is evidence that religious factors tend to have the biggest
positive impact on well-being within otherwise disadvantaged
demographic groups. Krause (1998) found that religiosity was
associated with reduced mortality only for older adults with low levels
of education. Banthia, Moskowitz, and Folkman (2007) found the same
effect for low education in the relationship between frequency of
prayer and self-reported health. This effect may indicate that religion
buffers negative effects suffered disproportionately by individuals
with lower socio-economic status. Or it may be linked with the notion
of ‘intellectual religion’ that highly educated people tend to be less
likely to derive a sense of existential certainty from their religious
beliefs.
Hayward & Elliott, supra note 32, at 593 (citation omitted). “[R]eligiousness is often
inversely related to education level and income (because the poor, lacking other resources
to fall back on, often turn to religion).” KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, at 226.
145
See supra Part IV (contending that the religion-happiness nexus can be traced both to
the effect of epistemological certainty and of conformity with social norms).
146
See KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, at 226 (examining the relationship between religion
and socio-economic status).
147
See supra Part II.C (connecting epistemological doubt with cognitive dissonance).
148
See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (“In some instances, [] cognitive dissonance can actually
intensify original attitudes.” (citation omitted)); Burris et al., supra note 46, at 19 (“Based on
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Where the stakes are high enough—as they are for the poor and
uneducated, whose epistemological order is most in jeopardy—the will
to believe can overpower dissonant cues.149 The believer might fortify
her epistemological armor to compensate for cracks. In this same vein,
the chronically infirm tend to seek refuge in religion.150 A vivisection of
one’s epistemology in such circumstances—the kind that Tillich and his
ilk envision—risks grave consequences for the psychological well-being
of the most vulnerable among us.
To ask the poor and uneducated to dissect their epistemologies is to
ask too much at best and to imperil a critical palliative at worst.151 Thus,
the comfortable and well-educated are more adept at marrying faith and
Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter’s field observations of increased religious fervor among
members of an apocalyptic religious group following a predicted cataclysm that failed to
transpire, this paradigm assumes that cognitive dissonance can occur when a cherished
belief is disconfirmed, leading to the use of dissonance-reducing strategies such as belief
intensification.” (citations omitted)).
149
See Burns, supra note 12, at 3 (“[T]he more important the concepts challenged the
greater the dissonance; the greater the dissonance, the more intense will be the need to
reduce it.”).
150
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 98 (“[A]n
important function of religion is to allay these concerns by assuring the presence of God
during this difficult time and reinforcing belief in continued existence after death. But
elders struggling with religious doubt are less likely to avail themselves of . . . an important
way of coping with anxiety about death.”).
151
See id. at 105–06 (stating that data consistently suggest that “older people with more
education are less likely to suffer from the deleterious effects of doubt than older adults
with fewer years of schooling”). Krause further states:
The data consistently provide support for this view across three
different indicators of psychological well-being: life satisfaction, selfesteem, and optimism. . . . [C]ompared to older people with high
education, older adults with less education are more likely to feel that
having doubts about religion is wrong; they are more likely to try to
deny or repress doubts when they arise; and they are less likely to
forgive themselves when they encounter doubts about their faith.
Id. at 106. Other scholars have stated:
[A]lthough individuals living in nations with highly difficult
circumstances generally have lower [subjective well-being], religious
individuals had higher positive affect and lower negative affect
compared with nonreligious individuals. In good circumstances,
nonreligious individuals, compared with religious individuals, had
slightly higher life evaluations, slightly lower positive affect, and lower
negative affect. In such circumstances, nonreligious individuals
generally had equal or better [subjective well-being] compared with
religious individuals.
Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1284. “Individuals who experience difficulties in embracing
religious doctrines or worldviews may be deprived of a key source of coherence and
meaning in their lives. This loss of a religious ‘plausibility structure,’ or orienting
framework . . . could generate or amplify existential uncertainty.” Ellison et al., Religious
Doubts, supra note 31, at 131 (citation omitted).
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doubt than are the straitened and uneducated.152 The latter also endure a
more painful struggle when dissonance manages to penetrate their
epistemological defenses.153 This is an intuitive finding, for stability in
circumstances buffers against instability in the mind. One more easily
endures psychic tumult if one knows that at least the comforts of life are
certain to be at hand.154
But the stakes of epistemological certainty are only part of the
equation here.
Tillich’s mature faith, the sort that successfully
assimilates doubt, demands sophisticated cognitive machinery. In F.
Scott Fitzgerald’s memorable articulation, “[t]he test of a first rate
intelligence is the ability to hold two ideas in the mind at the same time,
and still retain the ability to function.”155 This machinery is not
universal, nor does it spring full-fledged from the untrained mind. The
152
See Schwadel, supra note 6, at 164–66 (considering the impact of social status).
Schwadel explains that:
The traditional conception of the relationship between social status
and religion suggests that increases in education lead Americans to
compartmentalize religion to weekend service attendance.
Historically, this effect of education was tied to social status differences
among religious denominations, with the middle and upper classes
affiliating with denominations that are unlikely to stress the role of
religion in
daily
life
or the
practice of
devotional
activities. . . . [E]ducation should be positively related to switching to
mainline Protestant denominations, which commonly promote beliefs
that are in accord with scientific knowledge and worldviews, diverse
social networks, a pluralist perspective, and other attributes associated
with increased education.
Id. at 164–66 (citation omitted).
153
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 97. The
author states:
Given the lifelong influence of schooling and occupational experiences,
people with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to
apply their skills in wrestling with, and resolving, religious doubt. In
the process, each episode of confronting and resolving doubt may
build upon itself, promoting greater self-confidence in dealing with
doubt, thereby removing its sting.
Id.
154
Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1289. The authors elaborate:
In societies where circumstances are more benign, the non-religious
have superior life satisfaction, as well as less negative affect. They also
have greater social support and feelings of being respected. . . . The
nonreligious in poor societies are at the biggest disadvantage, with
noticeably lower positive feelings and higher negative feelings, as well
as substantial deficits in social support and respect.
Id.; Christopher G. Ellison et al., Religious Involvement, Stress, and Mental Health: Findings
from the 1995 Detroit Area Study, 80 SOC. FORCES 215, 230–34 (2001) (providing data on the
effects of social and psychological resources on health).
155
F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up, ESQUIRE MAG. 41 (Feb. 1936).
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capacity to forge a coherent epistemology from disparate parts requires a
subtle, capacious mind, the kind that tends not to flourish in poverty and
distress.156 Where sophisticated minds may weld faith and doubt into a
comfortable, harmonious epistemology, cognitive dissonance may drive
less expansive minds to despair. This insight has prompted some
observers to argue that religion is a compensatory mechanism for the
cognitively
underdeveloped—a
ready-made,
comprehensive
epistemology, with no assembly or reflection required.157
Cognitive dissonance tends particularly to discomfit the young,
whose minds and epistemologies undergo a dizzying maturation
process.158 Like the poorly educated, the young lack the cognitive
equipment necessary to assimilate doubt into their epistemologies, and
the relative instability of their lives—a steady barrage of constitutional,
intellectual, and circumstantial changes—compounds their inner
struggle.159 The old and seasoned, by contrast, have the cognitive
wherewithal to cope with epistemological struggle.160

156
See Puffer, supra note 134, at 236 (“Social skills such as being forceful, self-assured,
socially poised, confident, and verbally adept appear to be necessary ‘gear’ for people who
seek to expand their religious knowledge base.” (citation omitted)); see also Krause et al.,
Aging, supra note 87, at 526 (“[C]ollege students who had religious doubt were better able
to differentiate among alternative dimensions to problems and were more adept at
integrating alternative points of view.”).
157
See Christopher G. Ellison & Jeffrey S. Levin, The Religion-Health Connection: Evidence,
Theory, and Future Directions, 25 HEALTH ED. & BEHAV. 700, 714–15 (1998). The authors
quote Pollner:
As Pollner points out, “[r]eligious symbols and beliefs offer only one of
many types of tools for constructing a sense of meaning and
coherence.” For individuals with comparatively “restricted symbolic
codes,” however, strong “religious faith may offer an especially
compelling framework for interpreting daily experiences and major
life events alike.” In effect, then, personal religious faith and/or
practice may compensate for the lack of more sophisticated cognitive
resources. This possibility suggests that the effects of divine relations
and existential certainty on well-being may be strongest among
persons with lower levels of formal education . . . Moreover, there is
evidence that religious interpretations of life experiences may help to
compensate for the dearth of more sophisticated cognitive skills
among individuals with lower levels of formal education.
Id. (citations omitted).
158
See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 95
(“[Y]ounger people are more likely than older people to experience distress when religious
doubts arise.”).
159
See Dein, supra note 56, at 212 (“As people grow older, religious doubts continue to be
associated with psychopathology, but the magnitude of this association becomes weaker
across age categories; the impact of doubt on mental distress declines as one ages.”).
160
See Krause et al., Aging, supra note 87, at 527, 531–32 (offering supporting data).
Scholars have stated:
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VII. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
Thus far, this Article has outlined the psychological and sociological
literature on the religion-happiness phenomenon and attempted to
extract overarching insights from an occasionally desultory field of
inquiry. It will move now to a cursory overview of the implications of
these insights for the U.S. Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.
By no means do I intend an exhaustive commentary on the ramifications
of this burgeoning area of study. I seek only to provoke some
preliminary reflection on those ramifications.
Should courts and legislatures define free exercise rights expansively
so as to afford the faithful a shield against epistemological doubt? This
Article has attempted to show that dissonant cues—whether behavior
incongruous with convictions, exposure to prevalent unbelief or
religious diversity, or the prodding of an educator to embrace selfscrutiny—undercut epistemological certainty, enervating and even
reversing the religion-happiness connection.161 To what extent should
we permit religious individuals and communities to wield the law as a
cudgel against such cues?162
[T]he maturity and more extensive experience of those who are older
afford a greater ability to handle doubt. In fact, assets that accrue over
the years may even make it possible to turn doubt into a growth
experience . . . The data reveal that younger people may have more
problems handling religious doubt than older individuals.
In
particular, the noxious effects of doubt on well-being do not decline
substantially until about age [sixty] . . . The notion that older people
are more adept at dealing with doubt and uncertainty is consistent
with research on the emergence of wisdom in later life. . . . [A]lthough
doubt is associated with poorer mental health outcomes, our data
suggest that older adults are able to use resources that mitigate the
effects of doubt on depressive symptoms.
Perhaps repeated
experience in grappling with doubt . . . inoculates elderly people from
its noxious effects.
Id. (citation omitted).
161
See supra Part IV (explaining how conformity with social norms reinforces
epistemological certainty). Scholars have explained this theory as follows:
[W]hen controlling for other variables, faculty support for
spiritual/religious engagement is linked to increased religious
skepticism. . . . This may lead to doubts about religious truth being
reflected through increased religious skepticism during college, an
environment that may expose young adults to religious perspectives
that they did not encounter in their home communities.
Small & Bowman, supra note 86, at 166–68.
162
See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1300, 1312 (analyzing religious exemptions).
One scholar contends that:
The state should allow religious exemptions not only because freedom
to practice one’s religion is a fundamental right, but also because a
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The Supreme Court most famously and directly confronted this
question in Wisconsin v. Yoder, holding that the Free Exercise Clause of
the U.S. Constitution entitled the Amish to an exemption from
compulsory schooling laws.163 The Court recognized the right of the
Amish to cultivate their own, distinctive institutions, to rear their young
apart from the modalities of the modern world.164 Yoder continued a line
of precedent that began nine years earlier with Sherbert v. Verner.165 In
Sherbert, the Court held that South Carolina’s denial of unemployment
benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday
violated the Free Exercise Clause.166 The Sherbert-Yoder approach
imposed on the government the onerous burden of satisfying strict
scrutiny—that is, of showing that the contested measure advanced a
compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored means—in Free
Exercise Clause cases.167
Although the Court did not explicitly frame its rulings as such,
applying strict scrutiny to Free Exercise challenges signaled a victory for
epistemological certainty. In effect, the Court shielded the religious
objectors in these cases from cognitive dissonance, arising either from a
refusal to do so has detrimental effects on belief—belief being the one
religious freedom the Supreme Court has consistently regarded as
sacrosanct. In Reynolds and other religion cases, federal courts have
reiterated their commitment to freedom of belief. If restrictions on
religious practice actually change religious beliefs, then the Supreme
Court must consider, more seriously than it recently has, the protection
accorded those practices. . . . Roger Finke and Laurence Iannaccone
argue that religious developments mirror the changes in incentives
and opportunities facing the producers of religion. They chart how
legal restrictions have ended various religious movements, such as the
First Great Awakening in the eighteenth century, and how easing legal
restrictions has correspondingly allowed various religious movements
to flourish. . . . They posit that, in the post-Smith era, the government
may pass “any number of ‘formally neutral’ and ‘generally applicable’
regulations that seriously constrain the activities of specific religions”
without regard to their detrimental effects on some religions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
163
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
164
Id. at 222–24 (“Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by the majority, this record
strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within
our society, even if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’ . . . There can be no
assumption that today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are
‘wrong.’”).
165
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (examining broadly the
Court’s decision). For further discussion of Sherbert, see Gary C. Furst, Will the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike Three Against Preemptory Challenges?, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 701,
734–35 (1996).
166
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400–02.
167
Id. at 403.
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disjunction between belief and behavior (Sherbert) or from exposure to
divergent worldviews (Yoder).168 Yoder represented a particularly stark
clash between sheltered epistemological certainty and the prevailing
ideals of modernity as embodied in the public educational system.169
The former prevailed, as the Court upheld the right of religious
minorities to stand resolutely apart from mainstream society.170
But what the Court giveth, the Court taketh away.171 In Employment
Division v. Smith, the Court abandoned the Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny
analysis and held that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate
the Free Exercise Clause.172 In so doing, it threw free exercise rights to
the vicissitudes of the political process and stripped the faithful of the
right, ratified in Yoder, to wall themselves off from mainstream society.173
The Court’s decision sat uneasily with Congress, which attempted to
revive the Sherbert-Yoder precedent with the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).174 But the Court substantially diluted RFRA’s
impact when it invalidated its application to the states in City of Boerne v.

Id. at 404. According to Festinger:
Dissonance almost always exists after an attempt has been made, by
offering rewards or threatening punishment, to elicit overt behavior
that is at variance with private opinion. If the overt behavior is
successfully elicited, the person’s private opinion is dissonant with his
knowledge concerning his behavior. . . . ” [I]f forced compliance has
caused dissonance, one may reduce the dissonance by changing her
private opinion to accord with her overt behavior.
Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1317 (footnotes omitted). See generally Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222–24 (1972) (discussing the effects of exposure to divergent
worldviews).
169
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222–24; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1304 (discussing Wisconsin
v. Yoder). Harmer-Dionne explains:
Justice Berger further suggested that forced action (and perhaps forced
inaction) can affect religious belief. He wrote that to apply compulsory
education laws to the Amish would seriously endanger their religious
beliefs by exposing their children to antithetical values. This would
unjustly interfere with the religious development of the children and
their integration into the Amish community.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
170
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222–24.
171
See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1299 (“Since 1972, the Supreme Court has
rejected all claims for free exercise exemptions outside the context of unemployment
benefits as addressed in Sherbert.” (footnote omitted)).
172
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
173
See id. at 879, 890 (“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government . . . ”).
174
See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103141,
107 Stat. 1488 (providing the federal law aimed at preventing exemptions from federal laws
that substantially burden the free exercise of religion).
168
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Flores.175 To be sure, some states have enacted RFRA analogues, and
religious objectors can rely on state constitutional provisions to vindicate
their free exercise rights.176 But Smith effectively removed the most
formidable weapon in their arsenal—the U.S. Constitution.
Would a return to Sherbert-Yoder help the faithful keep cognitive
dissonance at bay and thereby redound to optimum happiness? This is a
thorny question that poses at least two major complications. I have
already addressed the first—that the happiness of the believer is but one
consideration in a broader happiness equation.177 Accommodating
religious objectors may entail substantial costs for society—or even, as
we have seen, for the objector herself if the conduct for which she seeks
an exemption buttresses a belief in a malevolent God.178 But the costs
and benefits of epistemological certainty for society at large are beyond
the objective of this analysis, which is to persuade the reader that the
prevailing taste for self-scrutiny and internal struggle in matters
religious may be misguided inasmuch as it detracts from individual
happiness. Thus, I will bracket this potential objection. I hasten to add,
however, that the happiness of the believer is hardly nugatory. To the
contrary, it is a meaningful part of the larger happiness calculus.
The second complication is subtler—might expanded free exercise
rights promote religious diversity and thus add to the dissonant cues
that weaken or reverse the religion-happiness nexus?179 Might a
religious monolith, a single Truth that swallows all competing truths,
redound to maximal happiness? The government could promote such a
hegemon one of two ways. First, it could directly support the one Truth
and muscle out its competitors. There is some empirical evidence that
such a posture promotes happiness. Indeed, government support of
religion correlates positively with intrinsic religiosity—for just as we
would expect dissonant cues to dampen genuine belief, so too would we
expect reinforcing cues to magnify it.180 In the United States, however,
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507–09 (1997).
See Sara Lunsford Kohen, Religious Freedom in Private Lawsuits: Untangling When RFRA
Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 80
n.262 (2011) (“Fourteen states have [adopted] state RFRAs, which are similar to the federal
RFRA, but apply to state law [analogues].”).
177
See supra Part V (explaining that individual happiness is only one variable in the
larger happiness calculus).
178
See supra Part VI (discussing how religion serves as a palliative for the poor and
uneducated).
179
See supra Part IV (explaining how dissonant cues in the external world undermine
religion’s salutary effect on happiness).
180
See Elliott & Hayward, supra note 82, at 302 (“[T]he association between personal
religious identity and psychological well-being increases as restrictions on overall freedom
increase.”).
175
176
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the Establishment Clause prevents such an embrace of religion.181
Alternatively, the government could simply withdraw and permit
majoritarian rule to operate unchecked, empowering religious majorities
to cement their dominance through the political process. Put differently,
it could do precisely what the Supreme Court did in Smith.182 If Smith
facilitates the emergence of a religious monolith, might we not applaud
it?183
My only response to this concededly compelling objection is that a
faith comprised solely of those values and principles that command a
consensus would be substantially neutered. It would in all likelihood
devolve into the sort of extrinsic religiosity that we have seen correlates
inversely with happiness.184 Like the elastic faith of mainstream
denominations, it would be a constellation of more or less universal
values, a worldview with too many lacunas to provide the comfort and
stability of epistemological certainty.185 Again, a universalist faith does
not necessarily entail epistemological doubt—though the data tend to
support the natural supposition that the two coincide.186 It is sufficient
to reiterate that mainline Protestants and Catholics—whose values
would assumedly prevail in a hegemonic arrangement—appear to be
less happy than believers on the margins of the religious landscape.187
Optimal happiness may demand insulating those marginal groups from
dissonant cues rather than converting them into discontented
Presbyterians.188
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding
that generally applicable, neutral laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
183
See Small & Bowman, supra note 86, at 168 (“Members of religious minority groups
often experience the privileging of Christianity and therefore may perceive a contradiction
inherent within the existence of multiple religious ideologies (minimally, their own and
that of Christians).” (citation omitted)).
184
See supra Part III.A (explaining the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
religiosity and their different effects on happiness).
185
See supra Part III.B (explaining the capacity of religious certainty to confer a feeling of
safety and security).
186
See generally PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 86 (detailing statistics
on religion in America and exploring the shifts taking place in the American religious
landscape).
187
See supra Part III.B (noting that adherents of marginal faiths tend to be happier than
those of mainstream faiths).
188
See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1310 (examining the response of the mainstream
to marginal religious movements). According to Harmer-Dionne:
A marginal religious movement (‘MRM’) is one which challenges the
social and theological norms of the dominant culture to such a degree
that the dominant culture feels compelled to marginalize and sanction
it, often with startling severity. In the face of mainstream opposition,
MRMs tend to follow one of two paths. On the first path, they may
181
182
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The unexamined life is not worth living. So goes the venerable
Socratic maxim, endorsed with gusto by enlightened, inquiring minds.
Should we embrace doubt and eschew the comforts of certainty—of an
orderly and stable moral, intellectual, and spiritual universe? Are we
better off in the shelter of dogmatism than in the crucible of doubt?
Should courts and legislatures cordon off a space within which the
faithful may shield themselves from cognitive dissonance? The religionhappiness literature illuminates these vital questions and suggests that
even skepticism itself ought not to escape the searching gaze of inquiring
minds.

continue to defy the dominant culture, in which case they remain in
small enclaves and face continued persecution, often leading to
obliteration. If MRMs follow the second path, they eventually
capitulate to mainstream pressure and incorporate dominant norms to
a sufficient degree to survive as viable entities.
Id.
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